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BEGIN:VEVENT
SUMMARY:Nate Flynn LODD (2018)
DTSTART;VALUE=DATE-TIME:20260723T040000Z
DTEND;VALUE=DATE-TIME:20260724T040000Z
UID:234585188741
DESCRIPTION:On July 23\, 2018\, a lightning strike at approximately 01:20 
 hours ignited a fire within the residence located at 7005 Woodscape Drive\
 , Clarksville\, Maryland. Smelling smoke\, the residents called 911 to rep
 ort the lightning strike and visible smoke in their home at 01:52:14. The 
 Howard County Communication Center\, which serves as the Public Safety Ans
 wering Point for Howard County\, then dispatched a Local Box Alarm 5-62 to
  the residence. The Local Box Assignment from Howard County Department of 
 Fire and Rescue Services (HCDFRS) included Paramedic 56\, Engine 101\, Eng
 ine 51\, Tower 10\, and Battalion 1.The residential structure at 7005 Wood
 scape Drive was a uniquely shaped single-family dwelling spanning approxim
 ately 8\,400 square feet. There are no fire hydrants on Woodscape Drive\, 
 however the residence included a swimming pool at the rear of the property
 . One aspect of 7005 Woodscape Drive that contributed to this incident’
 s complexity was the grade change along the rear of the residence (referr
 ed to as Side C throughout this report).HCDFRS established command at 02:0
 0:29 and upgraded the dispatch assignment to a full metro-box alarm. While
  en route\, Battalion 1 (Incident Commander) instructed Engine 51 to use t
 he pool at the rear of the property to establish a water supply\, unaware 
 that the first two arriving engines had not initiated a water supply plan.
  At 02:07:51\, Engine 51 entered the structure on the upper level of Side 
 C (laundry room door) but did not advise command of either their level of 
 entry or the conditions they encountered. Repositioning to the lower level
  of Side C\, Engine 51 re-entered the structure but did not make the Incid
 ent Commander aware of the grade change along Side C. At 02:12:41\, the I
 ncident Commander advised all units that residents had evacuated the struc
 ture.At 02:15:48\, Engine 101A advised the Incident Commander of visible f
 ire on the upper level of Side C and that they needed to redeploy back up 
 to their initial entrance (upper level of Side C) to reach the fire. Advan
 cing a pre-connected hose line from Engine 51\, Engine 101 entered the str
 ucture through the laundry room door located at the upper level of Side C.
  At approximately 02:20:11\, FF Flynn had fallen through the first floor i
 nto a basement level crawlspace containing active fire and high heat condi
 tions.Engine 101A\, recognizing that FF Flynn had fallen through the floor
 \, declared a MAYDAY emergency on Bravo 1\, the radio talk group used for 
 operations during this incident. While clarifying the MAYDAY emergency wit
 h Incident Command on Bravo 1\, FF Flynn transmitted his own MAYDAY state
 ment including a clear “Who\, What\, Where” on Bravo 2—an unmonitore
 d radio Talk Group. The Incident Commander quickly deployed the Rapid Inte
 rvention Crew (RIC)\, which entered the basement at approximately 02:27:17
  in search of FF Flynn. Overcoming numerous obstacles\, including multiple
  crew members becoming entangled in wiring\, the RIC located and extricate
 d FF Flynn by 02:43:39—fifteen minutes and five seconds after their init
 ial entry.After FF Flynn was removed from the dwelling\, those on scene fo
 llowed and exceeded all BLS\, ALS\, and ACLS protocols as FF Flynn was tra
 nsported to Howard County General Hospital. Tragically\, FF Flynn did not 
 survive.https://www.howardcountymd.gov/sites/default/files/2021-08/Flynn%2
 0LODD%20Report_FINAL%20(Declassified).pdf
LOCATION:
END:VEVENT
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