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BEGIN:VEVENT
SUMMARY:Father’s Day Fire \, NYC (2001)
DTSTART;VALUE=DATE-TIME:20250617T040000Z
DTEND;VALUE=DATE-TIME:20250618T040000Z
UID:175528752019
DESCRIPTION:June 17\,  2001\nFather’s Day Fire \, NYC\nFor almost 80 yea
 rs\, the Long Island General Supply store has been a fixture in the Long I
 sland City section of Queens serving local contractors and residents with 
 all of their hardware needs. Unfortunately\, that included propane tanks a
 nd other flammable liquids.\nFather's Day\, Sunday\, June 17\, 2001. The r
 elative calm was broken at 2:19PM with a phone call to the Queens central 
 office reporting a fire at 12-22 Astoria Blvd. Units arrived within 5 minu
 tes and gave the signal for a working fire. Fire fighters were making good
  progress but at 2:48PM something went terribly wrong.\nWitnesses on the s
 cene report hearing a small explosion followed by a huge blast. The shock 
 wave from the blast blew down every fire fighter on the street and knocked
  down the exposure 1 wall onto the sidewalk\, right on top of fire fighter
 s venting the building.\nAs members started sifting through the rubble\, t
 he chief ordered a second alarm followed almost immediately by a fourth al
 arm when a radio transmission was received from FF Brian Fahey from Rescue
  4. He was in the basement under tons of collapsed material.\n"I'm trapped
  in the basement by the stairs. Come get me." This was a battle cry to eve
 ryone on the scene. Every capable member frantically began removing debris
  to try and get to Brian and the others. The chief ordered more help. Nume
 rous special calls were made.\nThere were 144 pieces of apparatus at the s
 cene: 46 engines\, 33 ladders\, 16 battalion chiefs\, 2 deputy chiefs\, al
 l 5 rescues\, 7 squads\, and many more. In fact\, with the exception of th
 e fire boats\, the JFK hose wagon\, the Decon unit\, and the thawing units
 \, every type of special unit was at the scene.\nEven with the vast resour
 ces of the Department\, the task took several hours. The members that were
  on the sidewalk were quickly recovered. Fire fighters Harry Ford (R4) and
  John Downing (L163) were removed in traumatic arrest and brought to Elmhu
 rst Hospital. They were buried too long\, their injuries too severe. Alas\
 , there was nothing doctors could do.\nBack at the scene members still wer
 e trying to get to Brian while others were trying to put out the smoky fir
 e. The battle went through the afternoon and into the evening. The fire wa
 s being fueled by some of the flammables in the building. After about 4 ho
 urs they finally reached the basement\, but again\, it was too late. A gla
 ssy eyed Mayor Giuliani said\, "I can't think of a more tragic Father's Da
 y."\nThousands of fire fighters from all over North America showed up at t
 he funerals while fire marshals scoured the building looking for an explan
 ation. What exactly exploded? And what was the trigger event?\nIn time the
  truth came out. Two local kids were in the rear yard of the building when
  unbeknownst to them they knocked over a can of gasoline. The gasoline ran
  under the rear door\, into the basement eventually finding the water heat
 er. When the water heater kicked in\, it ignited the gasoline. As fire fig
 hters began working in the building the fire caused the explosion of a lar
 ge propane tank illegally stored in the basement. The resulting blast leve
 led the building and caused what will be forever known as the worst Father
 's Day in FDNY's history.\n\nhttp://www.cdc.gov/niosh/fire/reports/face200
 123.html\n\n
LOCATION:
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
SUMMARY:Hotel Fire\, Boston\, MA\nHotel Vendome Fire (1972)
DTSTART;VALUE=DATE-TIME:20250617T040000Z
DTEND;VALUE=DATE-TIME:20250618T040000Z
UID:324098613882
DESCRIPTION:On June 17th\, 1972\, a typical routine day was unfolding for 
 the Jakes in the Boston Fire Department. At 14:35 hours\, Box 1571 was rec
 eived at Boston Fire Alarm Office. It would be the first of four alarms re
 quired to extinguish an intense fire at the former Hotel Vendome on Common
 wealth Avenue at Dartmouth Street\, City of Boston\, Massachusetts. It too
 k nearly three hours to contain the blaze. The four alarm fire required a 
 compliment of 16 engine companies\, 5 ladder companies\, 2 aerial towers a
 nd 1 heavy rescue company\, with all companies operating with a full compl
 ement of personnel staffing.\nFollowing extensive and strenuous suppressio
 n operations\, the BFD commenced routine overhaul operation. Then\, at 17:
 28 hours\, without warning\, all five floors of a 40 by 45 foot section so
 utheast corner of the building collapsed\, burying a ladder truck and 17 f
 irefighters beneath a two-story pile of brick\, mortar\, plaster\, wood an
 d debris.\nMore than any other event in the three hundred year history of 
 the Boston Fire Department\, the Vendome tragedy exemplifies the risk intr
 insic to the firefighting profession and the accompanying courage required
  in the performance of duty. Nine firefighters were killed on that day\, e
 ight more injured\; eight women widowed\, twenty-five children lost their 
 fathers\; a shocked city mourned before the sympathetic eyes of the entire
  nation.\nThe Hotel Vendome fire and the Nine Line-of-duty deaths\, two Co
 mpany Officers and seven firefighters
• Lieutenant THOMAS J. CARROLL\,
  E-32.
• Lieutenant JOHN E. HANBURY\, JR.\, L-13.
• Firefighter TH
 OMAS W. BECKWITH\, E-32.
• Firefighter JOSEPH E. BOUCHER\, JR.\, E-22.
 
• Firefighter CHARLES E. DOLAN\, L-13.
• Firefighter JOHN E. JAME
 SON\, E-22.
• Firefighter RICHARD B. MAGEE\, E-33.
• Firefighter P
 AUL J. MURPHY\, E-32.
• Firefighter JOSEPH P. SANIUK\, L-13.\nBuilt in
  1871 and massively expanded in 1881\, the Hotel Vendome was a luxury hote
 l located in Boston’s Back Bay\, just north of Copley Square. During the
  1960s\, the Vendome suffered four small fires. In 1971\, the year of the 
 original building’s centennial\, the Vendome was purchased. The new owne
 rs opened a restaurant called Cafe Vendome on the first floor\, and began 
 renovating the remaining hotel into condominiums and a shopping mall.\nAlt
 hough the cause of the original fire was not known\, the subsequent collap
 se was attributed to the failure of an overloaded seven-inch steel column 
 whose support had been weakened when a new duct had been cut beneath it\, 
 exacerbated by the extra weight of water used to fight the fire on the upp
 er floors.\nhttp://www.cityofboston.gov/fire/memorial/vendome_fire.asp\n\n
LOCATION:
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
SUMMARY:Super Sofa Fire\, Charleston\, SC (2007)
DTSTART;VALUE=DATE-TIME:20250618T040000Z
DTEND;VALUE=DATE-TIME:20250619T040000Z
UID:127640464718
DESCRIPTION:The fire occurred at the Sofa Super Store\, which was composed
  of a 42\,000 ft² (3\,902 m²) single-story steel trussed showroom buildi
 ng with a 17\,000 ft² (1\,579 m²) warehouse building located behind the 
 retail space\,[1] located at 1807 Savannah Highway in the West Ashley area
  of Charleston. The building had no fire sprinkler system. The fire starte
 d at approximately 7:00 p.m. in a covered loading dock area built between 
 the showroom and warehouse buildings which was attached to both buildings.
 [2] At the time\, the business was still open and employees were present. 
 Charleston firefighters arrived on the scene just three minutes after the 
 alarm\, followed soon after by firefighters from the St. Andrews Public Se
 rvice District.\nThe initial attack focused on extinguishing the fire in t
 he loading dock area\, with a secondary effort to search for and evacuate 
 civilians\, and to prevent the fire from spreading to the showroom and war
 ehouse. Crews entering the showroom reportedly initially encountered clear
  visibility with only very light puffs of smoke visible near the ceiling a
 t the back of the showroom. Shortly thereafter\, an exterior door was open
 ed near where the fire was raging. Efforts to close the door failed\, allo
 wing the fire to enter the showroom. Firefighters were ordered to stretch 
 two hose lines into the showroom to attack the spreading fire\, however th
 e pre-connected hose line from one of the units was too short\, requiring 
 some firefighters to again exit the building to add additional sections of
  hose and leaving only one small handline to hold back the growing fire. A
 t about this time\, fire dispatchers advised the crews on-scene that they 
 had received a 9-1-1 call from an employee who was trapped in the warehous
 e\, which required some firefighters to direct their attention to the resc
 ue. The trapped employee was eventually rescued by firefighters who breach
 ed an exterior wall to reach him.[3]\nDespite efforts to confine and extin
 guish the fire\, it continued to spread into the structure and ignited fur
 niture in the showroom\, growing more quickly than the few operating hose 
 lines could control before additional water could be applied to the fire\,
  however efforts to stretch and begin operating additional hose lines cont
 inued.[3][4] At 7:41 p.m. the showroom area of the store experienced a fla
 shover while at least sixteen firefighters were still working inside. The 
 flashover contributed to the rapid deterioration of the structural integri
 ty of the building\, leading to a near-complete collapse of the roof just 
 minutes later. Many of the firefighters caught in the flashover were unabl
 e to escape and were trapped under the collapsed roof and shelving weakene
 d by the fast-spreading fire. Several calls for help were made by trapped 
 firefighters and efforts to rescue them were commenced. These efforts prov
 ed unsuccessful. By the time the fire was brought under control\, nine Cha
 rleston firefighters had been killed.\nThe fire started during waning rush
  hour traffic\, and the Sofa Super Store site was on a major business and 
 commuter artery feeding the suburbs and shopping centers of Charleston. Ca
 r traffic continued unabated for many critical minutes in the initial stag
 es of the fire\, driving over water supply lines and contributing to sever
 e water supply problems\, as the supply lines snaked from hydrants in surr
 ounding blocks up to a half-mile away from the center of the fire. Eventua
 lly automobile traffic on Savannah Highway was stopped so that water press
 ure would be more consistent\, the traffic diversion causing the surroundi
 ng neighborhoods to fill with stranded commuters and onlookers. As the fir
 e diminished and appeared contained\, nearing 11:00 PM\, surrounding neigh
 borhoods began to clear and onlookers went home\, most unaware of the loss
  of life during the blaze.\nAccording to Charleston County Coroner Rae Woo
 ten\, the firefighters died of a combination of smoke inhalation and burns
 \, but not from injuries sustained from the collapse itself.[5] It was the
  greatest single loss of firefighters in the United States since 343 firef
 ighters were lost in the collapse of the World Trade Center which resulted
  from the terrorist attacks of September 11\, 2001. It was also the deadli
 est fire in the state of South Carolina since 11 people died in a blaze at
  the Lancaster County jail in 1979.\nhttp://www.cdc.gov/niosh/fire/reports
 /face200718.html\n
LOCATION:
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
SUMMARY:Upstairs Lounge Fire\, New Orleans\, LA (1973)
DTSTART;VALUE=DATE-TIME:20250624T040000Z
DTEND;VALUE=DATE-TIME:20250625T040000Z
UID:163880409988
DESCRIPTION:On Sunday\, June 24\, 1973\, a group of members of the Metropo
 litan Community Church\, a pro-LGBT Protestant denomination\, had held ser
 vices inside the club\, after which the club had hosted free beer for 125 
 patrons. At the time of the evening fire\, some 60 people were listening t
 o pianist George "Bud" Matyi's music and discussing an upcoming MCC fundra
 iser for the local Crippled Children’s Hospital.\nAt 7:56pm\, Bartender 
 Buddy Rasmussen asked Luther Boggs to answer the door\, anticipating a tax
 i cab driver. Boggs opened the door to find the only staircase for regular
  entrance engulfed in flames initiated by the lighter fluid[1] (and not a 
 Molotov cocktail\, as commonly believed). Rasmussen immediately led some t
 hirty patrons out of the back exit to the roof until the group could climb
  down from another building's roof to the ground floor. Some thirty others
  were left inside the second-floor club\, and some attempted to squeeze th
 rough barred windows in order to escape. One man managed to squeeze throug
 h the 14-inch gap\, only to fall to his death while burning. Reverend Bill
  Larson of the MCC clung to the bars of one window until he died\, his cha
 rred remains being visible to onlookers for hours afterwards. MCC assistan
 t pastor George “Mitch” Mitchell managed to escape\, but then returned
  to the fire in order to attempt a rescue of his boyfriend Louis Broussard
 \; both died in the fire\, their remains having shown them clinging to eac
 h other.[2] Matyi also escaped\, but also returned to bring out more patro
 ns from the fire\; his charred remains were embracing those of two other v
 ictims under the piano.[3]\nAt least 29 people died in the 16-minute fire\
 , with three others (including Boggs) dying afterwards from their wounds. 
 15 were injured.\nAftermath\nThe official investigation failed to turn up 
 a conviction for the crime. The likely suspect who was arrested in relatio
 n to the attack was Rogder Dale Nunez.[1] When questioned\, Nunez went int
 o convulsions and was taken to Charity Hospital\, where he eventually slip
 ped out from doctor's watch and was never picked up again by police\, desp
 ite frequently appearing in the French Quarter afterwards. A friend later 
 told investigators that Nunez confessed to the deed while drunk on at leas
 t four occasions. He had told a friend\, Miss Fury\, that he squirted the 
 bottom steps with Ronsonol bought at a local Walgreens and tossed in a mat
 ch. He didn't realized the whole place would go up in flames.[1] Nunez kil
 led himself a year later. In 1970 he was diagnosed with "Conversion Hyster
 ia\," and four months before the fire he had visited a psychiatric clinic.
  His autopsy revealed a brain tumor.\n\nhttp://www.alynepustanio.com/UPSTA
 IRSLOUNGE.php\n
LOCATION:
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
SUMMARY:Nitrate Truck Explosion\, Marshall’s Creek\, PA (1964)
DTSTART;VALUE=DATE-TIME:20250626T040000Z
DTEND;VALUE=DATE-TIME:20250627T040000Z
UID:105033808839
DESCRIPTION:At 4:08 am Marshalls Creek Firemen were awakened to respond to
  a tractor trailer fire on Route 209 near the Snake and Animal Farm.  As t
 he firemen responded they had no idea what danger lay ahead.  Upon their a
 rrival they found the rear wheels of the tractor on fire.  There were no p
 lacards or warnings on the trailer to warn of its contents.  Shortly after
  the fire company’s arrival the trailer exploded killing 3 firemen\,  FR
 ANCIS MILLER\, 50\; LEONARD MOSIER\, 48 and EDWARD HINES\, 48 and seriousl
 y wounding 2 others\, RICHARD MCDONOUGH\, 40 and ROBERT HEID\, 33.  Three 
 civilians were also killed in the explosion\, bringing the death toll to 6
 .  The fire department also lost three trucks in the explosion.  It was la
 ter discovered that the trailer was carrying dynamite and blasting caps.  
 The driver had left the scene to place a phone call.\nThis tragedy was the
  beginning in a chain of events that would lead to the creation of the Dep
 artment Of Transportation (DOT) Emergency Response Guidebook (ERG).  With 
 the creation of the ERG changes were made that are still present today thr
 oughout the emergency services community.\n\nhttp://www.marshallscreekfire
 co.org/History\n\n\n
LOCATION:
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
SUMMARY:Yarnell Fire\, AZ (2013)
DTSTART;VALUE=DATE-TIME:20250630T040000Z
DTEND;VALUE=DATE-TIME:20250701T040000Z
UID:106279130762
DESCRIPTION:Yarnell Fire\, AZ (2013)  Nineteen firefighters died on the Ya
 rnell Hill Fire in central Arizona on June 30\, 2013 after deploying fire 
 shelters. They were members of the Granite Mountain Interagency Hotshot Cr
 ew (IHC)\, hosted by the Prescott Fire Department. One crewmember was sepa
 rated from the crew earlier that day and was not at the deployment site.\n
 \nhttp://www.iawfonline.org/Yarnell_Hill_Fire_report.pdf
LOCATION:
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
SUMMARY:Hackensack Ford\, Hackensack\, NJ (1998)
DTSTART;VALUE=DATE-TIME:20250701T040000Z
DTEND;VALUE=DATE-TIME:20250702T040000Z
UID:161501593282
DESCRIPTION:Five firefighters were killed on July 1\, 1988 inside an autom
 otive dealership in Hackensack\, New Jersey. At 3:00 pm initial companies 
 arrived on the scene after reports of “flames and smoke” coming from t
 he Hackensack Ford Dealership to find a heavy smoke condition at the roof.
  Companies were assigned inside and to the roof to investigate the source 
 of the smoke. The interior company\, manned with 6 firefighters and equipp
 ed with a 1 ½” hand line\, found light smoke conditions while the venti
 lation company noted heavy smoke conditions with no signs of structural we
 akness.  The tactical decision was made to ventilate the roof and attempt 
 to reach the fire through a scuttle access in the ceiling. This was pursue
 d until 3:34 pm when the battalion chief ordered all lines to be backed ou
 t. A minute later the truck company reported high heat and heavy fire at t
 he roof\, even though interior crews reported little heat or smoke. Soon a
 fter this transmission there was a roof collapse where the interior crews 
 were working. One firefighter managed to escape. His gear was badly burned
 .\n Three minutes after the collapse a mayday was transmitted by a lieuten
 ant that stated the he and another firefighter were “stuck inside the re
 ar of the building”. This initial transmission was never acknowledged on
  scene. Members at headquarters heard the transmission and relayed the inf
 ormation to command. For the next eleven minutes\, radio transmissions con
 tinued from one of the firefighters trying to relay his position. Rescue e
 fforts continued but were not successful. The bodies of the five firefight
 ers were only removed after the fire was extinguished an hour later. Three
  bodies were found about 20 feet from the scuttle hole. The other two were
  found in a tool room in the rear of the service area.  The cause of the f
 ire was ruled accidental and originated in the attic space above the servi
 ce area. In this area there were an abundant amount of automotive parts\, 
 tires\, and other combustible materials. Not only was this a huge fire loa
 d\, but the weight weakened the structural integrity of the roof. There we
 re no fire protection systems in place.\nhttps://youtu.be/Sfb-D6-ALh8\n\nh
 ttp://www.nytimes.com/1988/07/02/nyregion/5-firefighters-killed-in-jersey-
 as-a-roof-collapses.html\n\nhttp://www.nfpa.org/assets/files/PDF/Research/
 DealershipHackensack.pdf\n\n
LOCATION:
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
SUMMARY:Kingman BLEVE\, Kingman\, AZ (1973)
DTSTART;VALUE=DATE-TIME:20250705T040000Z
DTEND;VALUE=DATE-TIME:20250706T040000Z
UID:223911470269
DESCRIPTION:On July 5\, 1973\, Kingman was the site of a catastrophic BLEV
 E (Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapor Explosion) which killed 11 firefighters.
  The explosion occurred following a fire that broke out as propane was bei
 ng transferred from a railroad car to a storage tank. This explosion has b
 ecome a classic incident studied in fire department training programs worl
 dwide. Tank car #38214 was setting on a spur in the hot sun that the Willi
 ams Energy Company leased from the Santa Fe Railroad. The car carried 33\,
 000 gallons of propane gas which was to be transferred to storage tanks 75
  yards away. This was at the Doxol Gas Western Energy Co. bulk plant (2512
  East Highway 66)\, in the Hilltop business district on Kingman's southeas
 t side. Eemployees of the Williams Energy Company\, began opening the tank
  car's valves to transfer its load into smaller storage tanks in the compa
 ny yard. A leak was detected in one of the fittings and an attempt was mad
 e to correct it by striking the fitting with a large wrench. The gas ignit
 ed and turned the tank car into a huge blowtorch enveloping the two men. F
 lames shot 70 to 80 feet in the air in a V-shape.\nThe two men jumped or f
 ell off the car. One of them stumbled across the street \,a quarter mile t
 o the Highway Patrol office and stated his co-worker was still at the burn
 ing car. A ten-man squad of the 75-man Kingman Volunteer Fire Department r
 esponded to the alarm and began spraying the car with water\, hoping to ke
 ep the tank car cool and to prevent a pressure buildup inside it. Water wo
 n't extinguish burning propane\, but the Kingman FD had no equipment which
  would\, so all it could do was try to prevent an explosion. It sounded li
 ke the thunderous roar of a jet airliner taking off\, the tank car quieted
  for a second\, sucked the huge column of flames down into it\, swelled up
  and popped like a giant champagne cork. Two more times the flames vanishe
 d into the car and popped out. By this time one of the large transfer hose
 s was sending burning propane against the side of the tank car.\nA large c
 rowed of spectators congregated along Route 66 which separated them from t
 he burning tank car by nothing but less than two hundred yards of open des
 ert. Kingman police and Arizona Highway patrolmen were establishing roadbl
 ocks 1\,000 feet from the fire. Two minutes before two o'clock\, just as a
 n order to move people farther back was given\, the tank car exploded. The
  Kingman explosion sent debris and flames up to 2\,000 feet away with the 
 three-ton end of the half-inch-thick metal tanker landing a quarter mile d
 own the tracks. There was a crater 10 feet deep left where the tank car ha
 d been sitting. Flaming propane sprayed by the explosion along with fallin
 g debris from this cloud\, ignited several buildings in the vicinity. The 
 victims jammed the Mohave County General Hospital. Planes and helicopters 
 flew the most seriously burned victims to hospitals at Phoenix\, 175 miles
  to the southeast\, and Las Vegas\, Nev.\, 100 miles to the northwest.\nSl
 urry bombers\, stationed here by the Bureau of Land Management to fight ra
 nge fires\, dumped fire retardent mixtures on the flames which spread acro
 ss the highway. Helicopters were sent by the highway patrol and two Air Fo
 rce bases. The scene of the fire was highly visible to most of the town's 
 residents. A radio station's news flash and the fire department's siren pr
 obably drew more spectators to the scene than would have otherwise come ou
 t of mer curiosity. Mohave County Sheriff's Office\, Department of Public 
 Safety\, and Arizona Game and Fish personnel were joined by private citize
 ns in sealing off the fire area and rerouting the massive traffic. Mohave 
 General Hospital received 107 casualties from the explosion by way of the 
 one ambulance\, private cars\, police cars\, and anything else available. 
 Security at the hospital was to have been provided by outside personnel as
  well -- but many of these were themselves\, being treated for injuries or
  worse.\nSpectators and visitors gathered both outside the emergency depar
 tment and inside the treatment area. Due to the severe injuries there was 
 an executive decision made to let the loved ones be allowed inside with th
 e patients. The hospital was an unbelievable sight. The corridors were ful
 l of burn victims\, families\, doctors\, and nurses. Total material damage
  exceeded one million dollars. Everything for three to four hundred feet f
 rom the tank car's location was black and charred. After the explosion\, t
 he fire code became an instant issue. Essentially\, all the new ordinance 
 did was require all bulk storage tanks to be diked and to have some kind o
 f foam fire extinguisher system.\nThe ones in town that were moved\, were 
 provided an area out by the airport. Spur tracks like the one the explosio
 n happened on\, were to be sunk so that those cars would be in a pit. If t
 hey exploded\, the pit would force the blast upward so it wouldn't cause a
 s much damage.  As a result of the Kingman disaster\, standard procedures 
 for handling a BLEVE now became well-known in fire departments throughout 
 the country. Films and pictures taken at the disaster are part of the trai
 ning course.  As a result of the Kingman disaster\, standard procedures fo
 r handling a BLEVE now became well-known in fire departments throughout th
 e country. Films and pictures taken at the disaster are part of the traini
 ng course. Ironically\, a seminar had been scheduled for Kingman on July 1
 1 (6 days after the fire)\, to discuss "dangerous cargo spillage."\n\nhttp
 ://www.firefighternation.com/article/news-2/kingman-bleve-40-years-later
LOCATION:
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
SUMMARY:Hartford Circus Fire\, Hartford\, CT (1944)
DTSTART;VALUE=DATE-TIME:20250706T040000Z
DTEND;VALUE=DATE-TIME:20250707T040000Z
UID:792338775859
DESCRIPTION:Hartford Circus Fire\, Hartford\, CT (1944)  The fire began as
  a small flame about 15 minutes into the show\, on the southwest sidewall 
 of the tent\, while the Great Wallendas were on. Circus Bandleader Merle E
 vans is said to be the person who first spotted the flames\, and immediate
 ly directed the band to play "Stars and Stripes Forever"\, the tune that t
 raditionally signaled distress to all circus personnel. Ringmaster Fred Br
 adna urged the audience not to panic and to leave in an orderly fashion\, 
 but the power failed and he could not be heard. Bradna and the ushers unsu
 ccessfully tried to maintain some order as the panicked crowd tried to fle
 e the big top.\nSources and investigators differ on how many people were k
 illed and injured. Various people and organizations say it was 167\, 168\,
  or 169 persons (the 185 figure is usually based on official tallies that 
 included a collection of body parts that were listed as a "victim") with o
 fficial treated injury estimates running over 700 people. The number of ac
 tual injuries is believed to be higher than those figures\, since many peo
 ple were seen that day heading home in shock without seeking treatment in 
 the city. The only animals in the big top at the time were the big cats tr
 ained by May Kovar and Joseph Walsh that had just finished performing when
  the fire started. The big cats were herded through the chutes leading fro
 m the performing cages to several cage wagons\, and were unharmed except f
 or a few minor burns.\nThe cause of the fire remains unproven. Investigato
 rs at the time believed it was caused by a carelessly flicked cigarette bu
 t others suspected an arsonist. Several years later while being investigat
 ed on other arson charges\, Robert Dale Segee (1929–1997) who was an ado
 lescent roustabout at the time\, confessed to starting the blaze. He was n
 ever tried for the crime and later recanted his confession.\nBecause the b
 ig top tent had been coated with 1\,800 lb (816 kg) of paraffin wax dissol
 ved in 6\,000 US gallons (23 m³) of gasoline (some sources say kerosene)\
 , a common waterproofing method of the time\, the flames spread rapidly. M
 any people were badly burned by the melting paraffin\, which rained down l
 ike napalm from the roof. The fiery tent collapsed in about eight minutes 
 according to eyewitness survivors\, trapping hundreds of spectators beneat
 h it.\nThe circus had been experiencing shortages of personnel and equipme
 nt due to World War II. Delays and malfunctions in the ordinarily smooth o
 rder of the circus had become commonplace. Two years earlier\, on August 4
 \, 1942\, a fire had broken out in the menagerie\, killing a number of ani
 mals. Circus personnel were concerned about the 1944 Hartford show for oth
 er reasons. Two shows had been scheduled for July 5\, but the first had to
  be canceled because the circus trains arrived late and the circus could n
 ot set up in time. In circus superstition\, missing a show is considered e
 xtremely bad luck\, and although the July 5 evening show ran as planned\, 
 many circus employees may have been on their guard\, half-expecting an eme
 rgency or catastrophe.\nIt is commonly believed that the number of fatalit
 ies is higher than the estimates given\, due to poorly kept residency reco
 rds in rural towns\, and the fact that some smaller remains were never ide
 ntified or claimed. It is also believed that the intense heat from the fir
 e combined with the accelerants\, the paraffin and gasoline\, could have i
 ncinerated people completely\, as in cremation\, leaving no substantial ph
 ysical evidence behind. Additionally\, free tickets had been handed out th
 at day to many people in and around the city\, some of whom appeared to ey
 ewitnesses and circus employees to be drifters\, who would never have been
  reported missing by anyone if they were killed in the disaster. The numbe
 r of people in the audience that day has never been established with certa
 inty\, but the closest estimate is about 7\,000.[1]\nWhile many people wer
 e burned to death by the fire\, many others died as a result of the ensuin
 g chaos. Though most spectators were able to escape the fire\, many people
  were caught up in the hysteria and panicked. Witnesses said some people s
 imply ran around in circles trying to find their loved ones\, rather than 
 trying to escape the burning tent. Some escaped but ran back inside to fin
 d family members. Others stayed in their seats until it was too late\, ass
 uming that the fire would be put out promptly\, and the show would continu
 e.\nBecause at least two of the exits were blocked\, by the chutes used to
  bring the show's big cats in and out of the tent\, people trying to escap
 e could not bypass them. Some died from injuries sustained after leaping f
 rom the tops of the bleachers in hopes they could escape under the sides o
 f the tent\, though that method of escape ended up killing more people tha
 n it saved. Others died after being trampled by other spectators\, with so
 me asphyxiating underneath the piles of people who had fallen down over ea
 ch other.\nMost of the dead were found in piles\, some three bodies deep\,
  at the most congested exits. A small number of people were found alive at
  the bottoms of these piles\, protected by the bodies that were on top of 
 them when the burning big top ultimately fell down on those still trapped 
 beneath it. Because of a picture that appeared in several newspapers of sa
 d tramp clown Emmett Kelly holding a water bucket\, the event became known
  as "the day the clowns cried."\n\nhttp://www.circusfire1944.com/\n\n
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