BEGIN:VCALENDAR VERSION:2.0 PRODID:-//chikkutakku.com//RDFCal 1.0//EN X-WR-CALDESC:GoogleカレンダーやiCalendar形式情報を共有シェ アしましょう。近所のイベントから全国のイベントま で今日のイベント検索やスケジュールを決めるならち っくたっく X-WR-CALNAME:ちっくたっく X-WR-TIMEZONE:UTC BEGIN:VEVENT SUMMARY:Lakeview Grammar School Fire Collingwood OH DTSTART;VALUE=DATE-TIME:20260304T050000Z DTEND;VALUE=DATE-TIME:20260305T050000Z UID:301919617973 DESCRIPTION:The Collinwood school fire (also known as the Lake View School fire) of Ash Wednesday\, March 4\, 1908\, was one of the deadliest disast ers of its type in the United States. 172 students\, two teachers and a re scuer were killed in the conflagration in Collinwood\, Ohio\, a community that has since been absorbed into the city of Cleveland.\nWhile the Lake V iew School was built with load-bearing masonry outer walls\, much of the f our story building's floor structure system used wooden joists. It was one wooden joist that caught fire when it was overheated by a steam pipe. The building’s main stair case extended from the front doors of the buildin g\, up to the third floor\; without benefit of fire doors. The stairwell a cted like a chimney\, helping to spread the fire quickly. Oiled wooden hal l and classroom floors also fueled the fire.\nA common misconception about the building's design is that the doors opened inward. They did not\, as has been verified in accounts of the fire written at the time. Doors to th e building were equipped with common door knob latches\, not the more mode rn crash bar type latch. As panic leading to the crush of a large number o f students in stairwell vestibules contributed to the death toll\, student s also died as a result of smoke inhalation and the fire itself. Some chil dren died jumping from second- and third-story windows. Community members watched as victims trapped in the building were burned beyond recognition. \nThose killed in the fire who could not be individually identified\, as w ell as those students whose parents could not afford a burial\, were burie d in a mass grave in Cleveland's Lake View Cemetery. Additionally\, severa l families who lost their children in the fire chose to bury their childre n's remains adjacent to the Collinwood victims.[1]\nFollowing the fire\, t he remains of the Lake View School were demolished and a memorial garden p lanned for the site. A new school—Collinwood Memorial Elementary School —was built adjacent to the disaster site\, and incorporated many feature s that had been lacking in the previous building. Unlike the building invo lved in the disaster\, the new school incorporated fire safe stairwells\, a central alarm system\, and was built of steel framing and other fire-saf e materials. Although the new school was torn down in 2004\, a memorial pl aque remains on the site as new development is added to the area.\nIn the aftermath of the catastrophic Iroquois Theatre Fire in Chicago\, 1903\, a national drive was instigated to upgrade safe egress from buildings. Offic ial regulations required that doors now open from the inside and swing out ward\, thereby facilitating public exit. The installation of what were cal led "panic bar" latches were mandated for doors in schools. The final casu alty of the fire was the independence of the Collinwood community itself. Unable to sufficiently guarantee fire safety resources for its residents\, voters approved an annexation of Collinwood into Cleveland within two yea rs of the fire.[citation needed]\n\nhttp://www.deadohio.com/collinwood.htm \n LOCATION: END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT SUMMARY:Missouri Athletic Club Fire\, St. Louis MO (1914) DTSTART;VALUE=DATE-TIME:20260309T040000Z DTEND;VALUE=DATE-TIME:20260310T040000Z UID:308561757350 DESCRIPTION:http://www.stltoday.com/news/local/metro/years-ago-the-deadlie st-fire-st-louis-has-seen/article_9c957b3d-7d1d-57ef-8f18-283b08138440.htm l LOCATION: END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT SUMMARY:Strand Theater Fire Brockton\, MA (1941) DTSTART;VALUE=DATE-TIME:20260310T040000Z DTEND;VALUE=DATE-TIME:20260311T040000Z UID:319741733417 DESCRIPTION:In the heart of Brockton’s business district\, people usuall y flocked to the downtown area to shop or take in a show in what was a bus y part of the city. Sunday\, March 9\, 1941\, like all other Sundays\, dre w large crowds looking for the entertainment of a movie or vaudeville show . That evening the Strand showed the double feature\, “Hoosier School Bo y” starring Mickey Rooney\, followed by “Secret Evidence\,” a crime drama. \nLong after the curtain had closed and the crowds had filtered out \, a custodian discovered a fire burning in the Theatre basement and instr ucted his helper to activate the fire alarm box located at Main and High S treet. At 12:38 a.m.\, the fire department received Box 1311 and sent the first alarm apparatus to the scene. A second alarm followed shortly after the first\, and finally a general alarm was sounded bringing all of Brockt on’s apparatus to the Strand Theatre. \nWhen firefighters first arrived on the scene\, the fire did not seem very serious. However\, as time progr essed\, the fire gained headway. This became more apparent to those on the outside of the theatre than crews working inside. \nCrews knocked down th e fire in the basement with cellar pipes while flames raced through the ve rtical voids in the walls and ventilation ducts. Firefighters worked fever ishly to extinguish hidden fire while crews opened walls and ceilings in t he lobby and under the balcony. A number of men moved up to the balcony to attack the fire which had made its way to the auditorium ceiling just bel ow the roof. \nThe first signs of visible outside fire erupted from the so uthwest corner of the building as outside crews played a large hose-line o n the exposed flames. Firefighters on the balcony continued their efforts to expose the fire within the ceiling as hose streams were directed overhe ad from the auditorium floor. \nLess than one hour later\, the Strand Thea tre Fire turned from a routine fire into one of the worst tragedies in Bro ckton and Massachusetts history when the west section of the roof collapse d\, killing 13 firefighters and injuring 20 firefighters. \nUninjured fire fighters worked tirelessly to save their fellow brothers despite the dange r and fear of another collapse. Eventually\, fire departments from neighbo ring towns relieved Brockton firefighters. \nNo definite cause for the fir e was ever discovered. Initial reports of arson proved to be inconclusive. Further investigation revealed that the unprotected steel roof trusses pl ayed a major role in the collapse. The heat of the fire within the conceal ed space between the roof and the auditorium ceiling was believed to have distorted the steel trusses\, causing them to buckle and separate with eas e. Experts questioned the effectiveness of the construction and design use d in the roof assembly. Some reports state that the weight of a previous s nowfall may have added to the collapse. However\, witness accounts and pho tographs indicate a minimal amount of snow. \n\nhttp://commandsafety.com/2 011/03/the-strand-theatre-fire-brockton-ma-march-10-1941-13-firefighter-lo dd/\n LOCATION: END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT SUMMARY:Ebenezer Church Fire\, Pittsburgh\, PA (2004) DTSTART;VALUE=DATE-TIME:20260313T040000Z DTEND;VALUE=DATE-TIME:20260314T040000Z UID:281039342365 DESCRIPTION:March 13\, 2004\, two career firefighters with the City of Pit tsburg (PA) Fire Bureau were fatally injured during a structural collapse of a bell tower at the Ebenezer Baptist Church fire. Battalion Chief Charl es G. Brace (55 years of age) was acting as the Incident Safety Officer an d Master Firefighter Richard A. Stefanakis (51 years of age) was performin g overhaul\, extinguishing remaining hot spots inside the church vestibule when the bell tower collapsed on them and numerous other fire fighters. T wenty-three fire fighters injured during the collapse were transported to area hospitals. A backdraft occurred earlier in the incident that injured an additional six fire fighters. The collapse victims were extricated from the church vestibule several hours after the collapse. The victims were p ronounced dead at the scene. A total of twenty-nine other fire fighters we re injured during the incident. \n\nhttp://www.thecompanyofficer.com/2010 /03/16/learning-from-the-past-five-alarm-church-fire-and-collapse-leads-to -two-line-of-duty-deaths-lodd-and-twenty-nine-fire-fighter-injuries-three- hours-into-the-incident/#sthash.IyCibqJF.dpuf\n\nhttp://www.cdc.gov/niosh/ fire/reports/face200417.html LOCATION: END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT SUMMARY:Southwest Supermarket Fire Phoenix\, AZ (2001) DTSTART;VALUE=DATE-TIME:20260314T040000Z DTEND;VALUE=DATE-TIME:20260315T040000Z UID:640328623074 DESCRIPTION:On March 14\, 2001 the Phoenix (AZ) Fire Department lost firef ighter Brett Tarver at the Southwest Supermarket fire. In that event\, it was 5:00 in the afternoon\, the grocery store was full of people and fire was extending through the building. Phoenix E14 was assigned to the interi or of the structure to complete the search\, get any people out\, and atte mpt to confine the rapidly spreading fire to the rear of the structure. Sh ortly after completing their primary search of the building the Captain de cided it was time to get out. Tarver and the other members of Engine 14 we re exiting the building when Tarver and his partner got lost.\n\nThe engin eer (driver) was leading the group following the attack line they had brou ght into the supermarket fire\, followed by Tarver and his partner\, with the company officer being the last person to begin the long crawl out of t he smoke filled structure. At some point Tarver and his partner got off th e hose line and moved deeper in the supermarket fire away from their only exit. Early on during the exit attempt through maze like conditions Tarver and his partner basically turned left instead of right. Not knowing this the company officer continued to crawl out of the building thinking his wh ole crew was ahead of him on the attack line. Tarver and his partner crawl ed deeper into the fire occupancy eventually ending up in the butcher shop area where they eventually became separated.\n\nBased on radio reports of deteriorating conditions inside the building from E14 and other companies the Incident Commander (IC) considered a switch to a defensive strategy a nd started the process of pulling all crews out of the structure. During t his process Tarver radioed the IC telling him that he was lost in the back of the building. The IC deployed two companies as Rapid Intervention Crew s (RICs) through the front access point to no avail.\nOther companies comi ng to their rescue through the back room area of the supermarket later res cued Tarver's partner. After several unsuccessful rescue attempts\, Tarver succumbed to carbon monoxide poisoning from the acrid smoke and was event ually removed from the building as a full code. Trying to remove the 260-p ound firefighter was nearly impossible for rescue team members. Outside\, the resuscitation efforts failed.\n\nDuring the rescue efforts there were more than twelve (12) mayday's issued by firefighters trying to make the r escue. On this tragic day\, one other firefighter (attempting to rescue Ta rver) was removed in respiratory arrest and was later resuscitated by fire department paramedics on the scene.\n\nOver the next year (The Recovery)\ , the department systematically reviewed its standard operating procedures and fireground operational activities at the strategic (command)\, tactic al (sector) and task (company) levels of the entire organization in an att empt to prevent such a tragic event from ever happening again to the Phoen ix Fire Department. One of the many significant questions that was asked w as why didn't the rapid intervention concept work? Immediately after the f ire the Phoenix Fire Department reviewed its Rapid Intervention and Mayday standard operating procedures (SOPs). Based on drills\, training and the data acquired through those drills\, in the year following the incident th e standard concept of a rapid intervention is now being challenged. It is now evident that rapid intervention isn't rapid. (Reference: Excerpts from the original article by Steve Kreis and FireTimes.com\, LLC. http://www.f iretimes.com/printStory.asp?FragID=8399 )\n\nIn the wake of the 2001 South west Supermarket Fire and LODD of FF Brett Tarver\, the Phoenix (AZ) Fire Department issued a comprehensive report of the incident and the lessons l earned and research conducted by the FD.\n\nhttp://www.cdc.gov/niosh/fire/ reports/face200113.html\nhttp://www.cdc.gov/niosh/fire/reports/face200113. html LOCATION: END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT SUMMARY:The New London (TX) school explosion (1937) DTSTART;VALUE=DATE-TIME:20260318T040000Z DTEND;VALUE=DATE-TIME:20260319T040000Z UID:132773183275 DESCRIPTION:The New London School Explosion took place in 1937 in New Lond on\, Texas\, as the result of an undetected natural gas leak. The gas accu mulated in a crawl space under the school and filtered through the buildin g until it made contact with an electrical source\, igniting an explosion that collapsed the structure. Estimated fatalities range from 296-319\, ma king it the worst school disaster in U.S. history.\nNatural gas is difficu lt to detect because it is invisible and odorless\, but\, had the leak bee n discovered soon after it began\, the explosion could have been prevented . For this reason\, Texas mandated adding mercaptans to natural gas to mak e it odorous\, and make leaks detectable. This soon became standard practi ce worldwide.\n\nhttp://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aKt01p3DJRw\n LOCATION: END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT SUMMARY:Oscar Armstrong LODD Cincinnati\, OH (2003) DTSTART;VALUE=DATE-TIME:20260321T040000Z DTEND;VALUE=DATE-TIME:20260322T040000Z UID:272917982372 DESCRIPTION:Firefighter Armstrong and the members of his fire company resp onded to the report of a fire in a 2-story residence. The first fire depar tment unit on the scene\, a command officer\, reported a working fire. Fir efighter Armstrong assisted with the deployment of a 350-foot 1-3/4 inch h andline to the front door of the residence. Once the door was forced open\ , firefighters advanced to the interior. The handline was dry as firefight ers advanced\; the hose had become tangled in a bush. As the line was stra ightened and water began to flow to the nozzle\, a flashover occurred. The firefighters on the handline left the building and were assisted by other firefighters on the front porch of the residence. All firefighters were o rdered from the building\, air horns were sounded to signal a move from of fensive to defensive operations. Several firefighters saw Firefighter Arms trong trapped in the interior by rapid fire progress. These firefighters a dvanced handlines to the interior and removed Firefighter Armstrong. A rap id intervention team assisted with the rescue. Firefighter Armstrong was s everely burned. He was transported by fire department ambulance to the hos pital where he later died. The Cincinnati Fire Department prepared a death investigation preliminary report related to this incident. The report is available at the fire department web site for download. The origin of the fire was determined to be a pan of oil on the stove. Cincinnati Fire Depar tment web site - www.cincyfire.com\n\nhttps://apps.usfa.fema.gov/firefight er-fatalities/fatalityData/detail?fatalityId=1394\n LOCATION: END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT SUMMARY:Triangle Shirtwaist Fire NY\, NY (1911) DTSTART;VALUE=DATE-TIME:20260325T040000Z DTEND;VALUE=DATE-TIME:20260326T040000Z UID:224926370789 DESCRIPTION:The Triangle factory\, owned by Max Blanck and Isaac Harris\, was located in the top three floors of the Asch Building\, on the corner o f Greene Street and Washington Place\, in Manhattan. It was a true sweatsh op\, employing young immigrant women who worked in a cramped space at line s of sewing machines. Nearly all the workers were teenaged girls who did n ot speak English\, working 12 hours a day\, every day. In 1911\, there wer e four elevators with access to the factory floors\, but only one was full y operational and the workers had to file down a long\, narrow corridor in order to reach it. There were two stairways down to the street\, but one was locked from the outside to prevent stealing and the other only opened inward. The fire escape was so narrow that it would have taken hours for a ll the workers to use it\, even in the best of circumstances.\nThe danger of fire in factories like the Triangle Shirtwaist was well-known\, but hig h levels of corruption in both the garment industry and city government ge nerally ensured that no useful precautions were taken to prevent fires. Bl anck and Harris already had a suspicious history of factory fires. The Tri angle factory was twice scorched in 1902\, while their Diamond Waist Compa ny factory burned twice\, in 1907 and in 1910. It seems that Blanck and Ha rris deliberately torched their workplaces before business hours in order to collect on the large fire-insurance policies they purchased\, a not unc ommon practice in the early 20th century. While this was not the cause of the 1911 fire\, it contributed to the tragedy\, as Blanck and Harris refus ed to install sprinkler systems and take other safety measures in case the y needed to burn down their shops again.\nAdded to this delinquency were B lanck and Harris' notorious anti-worker policies. Their employees were pai d a mere $15 a week\, despite working 12 hours a day\, every day. When the International Ladies Garment Workers Union led a strike in 1909 demanding higher pay and shorter and more predictable hours\, Blanck and Harris' co mpany was one of the few manufacturers who resisted\, hiring police as thu gs to imprison the striking women\, and paying off politicians to look the other way.\nOn March 25\, a Saturday afternoon\, there were 600 workers a t the factory when a fire began in a rag bin. The manager attempted to use the fire hose to extinguish it\, but was unsuccessful\, as the hose was r otted and its valve was rusted shut. As the fire grew\, panic ensued. The young workers tried to exit the building by the elevator but it could hold only 12 people and the operator was able to make just four trips back and forth before it broke down amid the heat and flames. In a desperate attem pt to escape the fire\, the girls left behind waiting for the elevator plu nged down the shaft to their deaths. The girls who fled via the stairwells also met awful demises–when they found a locked door at the bottom of t he stairs\, many were burned alive.\nThose workers who were on floors abov e the fire\, including the owners\, escaped to the roof and then to adjoin ing buildings. As firefighters arrived\, they witnessed a horrible scene. The girls who did not make it to the stairwells or the elevator were trapp ed by the fire inside the factory and began to jump from the windows to es cape it. The bodies of the jumpers fell on the fire hoses\, making it diff icult to begin fighting the fire. Also\, the firefighters ladders reached only seven floors high and the fire was on the eighth floor. In one case\, a life net was unfurled to catch jumpers\, but three girls jumped at the same time\, ripping the net. The nets turned out to be mostly ineffectual. \nWithin 18 minutes\, it was all over. Forty-nine workers had burned to de ath or been suffocated by smoke\, 36 were dead in the elevator shaft and 5 8 died from jumping to the sidewalks. With two more dying later from their injuries\, a total of 145 people were killed by the fire. The workers uni on set up a march on April 5 on New York's Fifth Avenue to protest the con ditions that had led to the fire\; it was attended by 80\,000 people.\nDes pite a good deal of evidence that the owners and management had been horri bly negligent in the fire\, a grand jury failed to indict them on manslaug hter charges. Still\, the massacre for which they were responsible did fin ally compel the city to enact reform. In addition to the Sullivan-Hoey Fir e Prevention Law passed that October\, the New York Democratic set took up the cause of the worker and became known as a reform party. Both were cru cial in preventing similar disasters in the future.\n\nhttp://www.youtube. com/watch?v=gKdMuVu1wi8\n LOCATION: END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT SUMMARY:Happy Land Social Club Fire NY\, NY (1990) DTSTART;VALUE=DATE-TIME:20260325T040000Z DTEND;VALUE=DATE-TIME:20260326T040000Z UID:864641175781 DESCRIPTION:Before the blaze\, Happy Land was ordered closed for building code violations in November 1988. Violations included no fire exits\, alar ms or sprinkler system. No follow-up by the fire department was documented .[2]\nThe evening of the fire\, González had argued with his former girlf riend\, Lydia Feliciano\, a coat check girl at the club\, urging her to qu it. She claimed that she had had enough of him and wanted nothing to do wi th him anymore. González tried to fight back into the club but was ejecte d by the bouncer. He was heard to scream drunken threats in the process. G onzález was enraged\, not just because of losing Lydia\, but also because he had recently lost his job at a lamp factory\, was impoverished\, and h ad virtually no companions.[citation needed] González returned to the est ablishment with a plastic container of gasoline which he found on the grou nd and had filled at a gas station. He spread the fuel on the only stairca se into the club. Two matches were then used to ignite the gasoline.[citat ion needed]\nThe fire exits had been blocked to prevent people from enteri ng without paying the cover charge. In the panic that ensued\, a few peopl e escaped by breaking a metal gate over one door.[citation needed]\nGonzá lez then returned home\, took off his gasoline-soaked clothes and fell asl eep. He was arrested the following afternoon after authorities interviewed Lydia Feliciano and learned of the previous night's argument. Once advise d of his rights\, he admitted to starting the blaze. A psychological exami nation found him to be not responsible due to mental illness or defect\;[c itation needed] but the jury\, after deliberation\, found him to be crimin ally responsible.\n[edit]\nAftermath\nFound guilty on August 19\, 1991\, o f 87 counts of arson and 87 counts of murder\, González was charged with 174 counts of murder—two for each victim. For each count he received the sentence maximum of 25 years to life (a total of 4\,350 years). It was th e most substantial prison term ever imposed in the state of New York. He w ill be eligible for parole in March 2015 because New York law states that multiple murders occurring during one act will be served concurrently\, ra ther than consecutively.[3]\nThe building that housed Happy Land club was managed in part by Jay Weiss\, at the time the husband of actress Kathleen Turner.[4] The New Yorker quoted Turner saying that "the fire was unfortu nate but could have happened at a McDonald's."[5] The building's owner\, A lex DiLorenzo\, and leaseholders Weiss and Morris Jaffe\, were found not c riminally responsible\, since they had tried to close the club and evict t he tenant.[6]\nThe street outside the former Happy Land social club (which was located on the northwest corner of Southern Boulevard and East Tremon t Avenue in the Bronx) has been renamed "The Plaza of the Eighty-Seven" as a way of memorializing the victims. Five of the victims were students at nearby Theodore Roosevelt High School\, which held a memorial service for the victims in April 1990. A memorial was erected directly across the stre et from the former establishment with the names of all 87 victims enscribe d on it.\nThe arson was the subject of the Duran Duran song\, "Sin of the City" (where the song lyrics say 89 people died\, when in fact it was 87)\ , a Joe Jackson song\, "Happyland"\, and Tom Russell's song "A Dollar's Wo rth of Gasoline" from his Hurricane Season CD. It was also mentioned in th e Jay-Z song\, "You\, Me\, Him\, and Her." A fictionalized version of the arson\, where it was an arson intended to intimidate the Latino community\ , was featured on Law & Order.\nHappy Land Social Club Fire NY\, NY (1990) \nScheduled: Mar 25\, 2014\nBefore the blaze\, Happy Land was ordered clos ed for building code violations in November 1988. Violations included no f ire exits\, alarms or sprinkler system. No follow-up by the fire departmen t was documented.[2]\nThe evening of the fire\, González had argued with his former girlfriend\, Lydia Feliciano\, a coat check girl at the club\, urging her to quit. She claimed that she had had enough of him and wanted nothing to do with him anymore. González tried to fight back into the clu b but was ejected by the bouncer. He was heard to scream drunken threats i n the process. González was enraged\, not just because of losing Lydia\, but also because he had recently lost his job at a lamp factory\, was impo verished\, and had virtually no companions.[citation needed] González ret urned to the establishment with a plastic container of gasoline which he f ound on the ground and had filled at a gas station. He spread the fuel on the only staircase into the club. Two matches were then used to ignite the gasoline.[citation needed]\nThe fire exits had been blocked to prevent pe ople from entering without paying the cover charge. In the panic that ensu ed\, a few people escaped by breaking a metal gate over one door.[citation needed]\nGonzález then returned home\, took off his gasoline-soaked clot hes and fell asleep. He was arrested the following afternoon after authori ties interviewed Lydia Feliciano and learned of the previous night's argum ent. Once advised of his rights\, he admitted to starting the blaze. A psy chological examination found him to be not responsible due to mental illne ss or defect\;[citation needed] but the jury\, after deliberation\, found him to be criminally responsible.\n[edit]\nAftermath\nFound guilty on Augu st 19\, 1991\, of 87 counts of arson and 87 counts of murder\, González w as charged with 174 counts of murder—two for each victim. For each count he received the sentence maximum of 25 years to life (a total of 4\,350 y ears). It was the most substantial prison term ever imposed in the state o f New York. He will be eligible for parole in March 2015 because New York law states that multiple murders occurring during one act will be served c oncurrently\, rather than consecutively.[3]\nThe building that housed Happ y Land club was managed in part by Jay Weiss\, at the time the husband of actress Kathleen Turner.[4] The New Yorker quoted Turner saying that "the fire was unfortunate but could have happened at a McDonald's."[5] The buil ding's owner\, Alex DiLorenzo\, and leaseholders Weiss and Morris Jaffe\, were found not criminally responsible\, since they had tried to close the club and evict the tenant.[6]\nThe street outside the former Happy Land so cial club (which was located on the northwest corner of Southern Boulevard and East Tremont Avenue in the Bronx) has been renamed "The Plaza of the Eighty-Seven" as a way of memorializing the victims. Five of the victims w ere students at nearby Theodore Roosevelt High School\, which held a memor ial service for the victims in April 1990. A memorial was erected directly across the street from the former establishment with the names of all 87 victims enscribed on it.\nThe arson was the subject of the Duran Duran son g\, "Sin of the City" (where the song lyrics say 89 people died\, when in fact it was 87)\, a Joe Jackson song\, "Happyland"\, and Tom Russell's son g "A Dollar's Worth of Gasoline" from his Hurricane Season CD. It was also mentioned in the Jay-Z song\, "You\, Me\, Him\, and Her." A fictionalized version of the arson\, where it was an arson intended to intimidate the L atino community\, was featured on Law & Order.\n\nhttp://www.fireengineeri ng.com/articles/print/volume-154/issue-8/features/happy-land-fire-have-we- learned-the-lessons.html\n LOCATION: END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT SUMMARY:Back Bay Blaze-Beacon St Fire-Boston (2014) DTSTART;VALUE=DATE-TIME:20260326T040000Z DTEND;VALUE=DATE-TIME:20260327T040000Z UID:105165985753 DESCRIPTION:March 26\, 2014 \nLieutenant Edward J. Walsh\, 43 Engine 33\nFirefighter Michael R. Kennedy\, 33 Ladder 15\n\n The y died from injuries they received in the performance of their duties whil e operating at Box 1579\, 9 alarms. Both were in the basement and became t rapped when the fire cut off their exits. Other members made valiant effor ts to rescue them but were driven back. Fire in a 4/5 story Brownstone at 298 Beacon Street\, Back Bay on a very windy afternoon. Lieutenant Walsh had just under 13 years of service and Firefighter Kennedy had just under 7 years of service. May they both RIP.\nhttps://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6R bnKWpzMCE\n LOCATION: END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT SUMMARY:6020 DAHLGREN STREET Cincinnati LODD Daryl Gordon DTSTART;VALUE=DATE-TIME:20260326T040000Z DTEND;VALUE=DATE-TIME:20260327T040000Z UID:641428015901 DESCRIPTION:March 26\, 2015\, FAO Daryl Gordon died after falling down an unsecured elevator shaft. The FAO was assigned to Heavy Rescue 14\, which responded on the second alarm to a working fire on the second floor of a f ive-story residential apartment building. The four-person Heavy Rescue 14 was assigned to search for occupants on the fifth floor. The crew advanced to the fifth floor and began searching apartments. The FAO was the last H eavy Rescue 14 crew member to enter the fifth floor and became separated f rom the rest of his crew. Visibility was limited to about five feet becaus e of moderate smoke. The floor had a centrally located hallway providing a ccess to eight residential apartments. A hydraulic elevator located near t he center of the building provided access to each floor. The elevator was accessible on each floor by an outward-swinging metal door that included a locking mechanism at the top left corner designed to keep the door closed until the elevator car reached that floor. The locking mechanism on the f ifth floor was not functioning properly on this date.\n \nThree members of Heavy Rescue 14 observed that the door could be easily opened. They repor ted this finding to the search and rescue operations chief (District Chief 3) who was on the fifth floor. A fire fighter used a permanent marker to write “Do Not Enter. Open Shaft” on the elevator door. A short time la ter\, the FAO\, believed to be looking for his crew\, opened the elevator door and fell approximately 24 feet down the elevator shaft\, striking the top rear edge of the elevator car and became stuck between the rear of th e elevator car and the elevator shaft wall. The acting officer on Heavy Re scue 14 radioed a Mayday after realizing the FAO had fallen down the eleva tor shaft. Extrication efforts took approximately 14 minutes from the time of the Mayday. The FAO was pronounced dead at a local hospital. Three fir efighters received minor injuries extinguishing the fire. The fire departm ent successfully rescued 21 civilian occupants from their apartments durin g the incident.\n\nhttps://www.cdc.gov/niosh/fire/pdfs/face201506.pdf\n LOCATION: END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT SUMMARY:Salaried Fire Department Established Cincinnati\, OH (1853) DTSTART;VALUE=DATE-TIME:20260401T040000Z DTEND;VALUE=DATE-TIME:20260402T040000Z UID:965685642135 DESCRIPTION:By the 1700s\, independent volunteer fire companies began rece iving payment for their services from the insurance company or the propert y owner. Property owners displayed fire markers outside the building to in dicate that they were insured\; in some cases\, no marker meant no effort would be made to fight the fire. In other cases\, only the first arriving companies got paid\, which led to fierce competition. Volunteers sabotaged each other's equipment and fought off later-arriving companies\, often us ing fire-fighting equipment as weapons. Often\, the building burned down w hile the firemen brawled.\nFire Department Orgination.\nEarly in 1853 the Cincinnati\, Ohio\, Fire Department Committee formulated a plan that would entirely change the way fires were fought in America. To end the frequent ly violent competition between companies\, the plan called for full-time\, paid city employees to fight fires using a horse-drawn steam engine. The steam pumper would allow four or five men to spray more water on a fire th an hundreds of volunteers using hand pumpers. The City Council on 16 March 1853 authorized the plan and the creation of a Fire Department\, effectiv e 1 April.\n\n LOCATION: END:VEVENT END:VCALENDAR