BEGIN:VCALENDAR VERSION:2.0 PRODID:-//chikkutakku.com//RDFCal 1.0//EN X-WR-CALDESC:GoogleカレンダーやiCalendar形式情報を共有シェ アしましょう。近所のイベントから全国のイベントま で今日のイベント検索やスケジュールを決めるならち っくたっく X-WR-CALNAME:ちっくたっく X-WR-TIMEZONE:UTC BEGIN:VEVENT SUMMARY:Katie Jane Nursing Home Fire DTSTART;VALUE=DATE-TIME:20260217T050000Z DTEND;VALUE=DATE-TIME:20260218T050000Z UID:603319280453 DESCRIPTION:The Warrenton Nursing Home fire took place at the Katie Jane M emorial Home for the Aged in Warrenton\, Missouri on February 17\, 1957 an d killed 72 people. The 2 1⁄2-story facility\, located sixty miles west of St. Louis\, housed 155 elderly people and had been converted just two y ears earlier after having previously served as the site of Central Wesleya n College.\nThe blaze began at approximately 2:40 p.m. in a first floor an nex linen closet during a Sunday afternoon religious service. On the first floor of the main building\, Lutheran minister Walter Schwane was leading a hymn\, "What a Friend We Have in Jesus\," when a scream was heard from one of the visitors who had noticed smoke near the room of her uncles. Con cerned\, she soon saw intense flames near the closet and screamed "Fire!" as she raced throughout the facility.\nWithin 30 minutes\, the annex build ing became an inferno with local residents offering help in attempting to rescue residents. Eventually\, the building's roof caved in\, with flames shooting high into the air and smoke visible from 30 miles away.\nIn the a ftermath of the tragedy\, it was determined that a number of factors serve d as potential causes\, including wood in the building that was more than 50 years old\, coupled with thermostats often kept at 85-90 degrees to kee p residents comfortable during the frigid winter months.\nDuring the subse quent investigation the Home had been operating without a license\, had in adequate fire escapes and had no sprinkler system. In addition\, there was no alarm system or evacuation plan\, while some residents were locked in their rooms\, a common practice of that period.\nThe end result of those o missions came when Missouri governor James T. Blair signed a bill in March 1957 that established minimum safety standards for nursing homes in the s tate\n\nhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Warrenton_Nursing_Home_Fire LOCATION: END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT SUMMARY:The Station Nightclub Fire DTSTART;VALUE=DATE-TIME:20260220T050000Z DTEND;VALUE=DATE-TIME:20260221T050000Z UID:933792287247 DESCRIPTION:The Station Nightclub Fire occurred in West Warwick\, Rhode Is land\, in 2003. The fire began when the tour manager of Great White\, the headlining band\, set off pyrotechnics that spread through the soundproofi ng foam at the back of the stage. The flames quickly moved to the ceiling\ , creating billows of smoke and a panicked race for the front door. There was no automatic fire sprinkler system to put out the flames\, and of the 404 nightclub occupants\, 100 were killed and 200 were injured.\nThe club did not have an automatic fire sprinkler system to extinguish the fire\, a nd most of the victims died at the primary entrance where the rush of fran tic spectators created a logjam at the front door. Although the club was a t capacity\, it was not overcrowded\, so failed escape attempts were not a result of the overcrowding of the nightclub. Instead\, they resulted from the fact that people neglected to use exit routes other than the front do or. For this reason\, Campus Safety and Security and FPS have teamed with the Student Government\, Texas State Fire Marshal’s office\, and Lower C olorado River Authority in the Have an Exit Strategy campaign\, to heighte n awareness among nightclub and party goers that\, “The best way out may not the be way in.”\n\nhttp://www.nfpa.org/safety-information/for-consu mers/occupancies/nightclubs-assembly-occupancies/the-station-nightclub-fir e\n LOCATION: END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT SUMMARY:Lakeview Grammar School Fire Collingwood OH DTSTART;VALUE=DATE-TIME:20260304T050000Z DTEND;VALUE=DATE-TIME:20260305T050000Z UID:301919617973 DESCRIPTION:The Collinwood school fire (also known as the Lake View School fire) of Ash Wednesday\, March 4\, 1908\, was one of the deadliest disast ers of its type in the United States. 172 students\, two teachers and a re scuer were killed in the conflagration in Collinwood\, Ohio\, a community that has since been absorbed into the city of Cleveland.\nWhile the Lake V iew School was built with load-bearing masonry outer walls\, much of the f our story building's floor structure system used wooden joists. It was one wooden joist that caught fire when it was overheated by a steam pipe. The building’s main stair case extended from the front doors of the buildin g\, up to the third floor\; without benefit of fire doors. The stairwell a cted like a chimney\, helping to spread the fire quickly. Oiled wooden hal l and classroom floors also fueled the fire.\nA common misconception about the building's design is that the doors opened inward. They did not\, as has been verified in accounts of the fire written at the time. Doors to th e building were equipped with common door knob latches\, not the more mode rn crash bar type latch. As panic leading to the crush of a large number o f students in stairwell vestibules contributed to the death toll\, student s also died as a result of smoke inhalation and the fire itself. Some chil dren died jumping from second- and third-story windows. Community members watched as victims trapped in the building were burned beyond recognition. \nThose killed in the fire who could not be individually identified\, as w ell as those students whose parents could not afford a burial\, were burie d in a mass grave in Cleveland's Lake View Cemetery. Additionally\, severa l families who lost their children in the fire chose to bury their childre n's remains adjacent to the Collinwood victims.[1]\nFollowing the fire\, t he remains of the Lake View School were demolished and a memorial garden p lanned for the site. A new school—Collinwood Memorial Elementary School —was built adjacent to the disaster site\, and incorporated many feature s that had been lacking in the previous building. Unlike the building invo lved in the disaster\, the new school incorporated fire safe stairwells\, a central alarm system\, and was built of steel framing and other fire-saf e materials. Although the new school was torn down in 2004\, a memorial pl aque remains on the site as new development is added to the area.\nIn the aftermath of the catastrophic Iroquois Theatre Fire in Chicago\, 1903\, a national drive was instigated to upgrade safe egress from buildings. Offic ial regulations required that doors now open from the inside and swing out ward\, thereby facilitating public exit. The installation of what were cal led "panic bar" latches were mandated for doors in schools. The final casu alty of the fire was the independence of the Collinwood community itself. Unable to sufficiently guarantee fire safety resources for its residents\, voters approved an annexation of Collinwood into Cleveland within two yea rs of the fire.[citation needed]\n\nhttp://www.deadohio.com/collinwood.htm \n LOCATION: END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT SUMMARY:Missouri Athletic Club Fire\, St. Louis MO (1914) DTSTART;VALUE=DATE-TIME:20260309T040000Z DTEND;VALUE=DATE-TIME:20260310T040000Z UID:308561757350 DESCRIPTION:http://www.stltoday.com/news/local/metro/years-ago-the-deadlie st-fire-st-louis-has-seen/article_9c957b3d-7d1d-57ef-8f18-283b08138440.htm l LOCATION: END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT SUMMARY:Strand Theater Fire Brockton\, MA (1941) DTSTART;VALUE=DATE-TIME:20260310T040000Z DTEND;VALUE=DATE-TIME:20260311T040000Z UID:319741733417 DESCRIPTION:In the heart of Brockton’s business district\, people usuall y flocked to the downtown area to shop or take in a show in what was a bus y part of the city. Sunday\, March 9\, 1941\, like all other Sundays\, dre w large crowds looking for the entertainment of a movie or vaudeville show . That evening the Strand showed the double feature\, “Hoosier School Bo y” starring Mickey Rooney\, followed by “Secret Evidence\,” a crime drama. \nLong after the curtain had closed and the crowds had filtered out \, a custodian discovered a fire burning in the Theatre basement and instr ucted his helper to activate the fire alarm box located at Main and High S treet. At 12:38 a.m.\, the fire department received Box 1311 and sent the first alarm apparatus to the scene. A second alarm followed shortly after the first\, and finally a general alarm was sounded bringing all of Brockt on’s apparatus to the Strand Theatre. \nWhen firefighters first arrived on the scene\, the fire did not seem very serious. However\, as time progr essed\, the fire gained headway. This became more apparent to those on the outside of the theatre than crews working inside. \nCrews knocked down th e fire in the basement with cellar pipes while flames raced through the ve rtical voids in the walls and ventilation ducts. Firefighters worked fever ishly to extinguish hidden fire while crews opened walls and ceilings in t he lobby and under the balcony. A number of men moved up to the balcony to attack the fire which had made its way to the auditorium ceiling just bel ow the roof. \nThe first signs of visible outside fire erupted from the so uthwest corner of the building as outside crews played a large hose-line o n the exposed flames. Firefighters on the balcony continued their efforts to expose the fire within the ceiling as hose streams were directed overhe ad from the auditorium floor. \nLess than one hour later\, the Strand Thea tre Fire turned from a routine fire into one of the worst tragedies in Bro ckton and Massachusetts history when the west section of the roof collapse d\, killing 13 firefighters and injuring 20 firefighters. \nUninjured fire fighters worked tirelessly to save their fellow brothers despite the dange r and fear of another collapse. Eventually\, fire departments from neighbo ring towns relieved Brockton firefighters. \nNo definite cause for the fir e was ever discovered. Initial reports of arson proved to be inconclusive. Further investigation revealed that the unprotected steel roof trusses pl ayed a major role in the collapse. The heat of the fire within the conceal ed space between the roof and the auditorium ceiling was believed to have distorted the steel trusses\, causing them to buckle and separate with eas e. Experts questioned the effectiveness of the construction and design use d in the roof assembly. Some reports state that the weight of a previous s nowfall may have added to the collapse. However\, witness accounts and pho tographs indicate a minimal amount of snow. \n\nhttp://commandsafety.com/2 011/03/the-strand-theatre-fire-brockton-ma-march-10-1941-13-firefighter-lo dd/\n LOCATION: END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT SUMMARY:Ebenezer Church Fire\, Pittsburgh\, PA (2004) DTSTART;VALUE=DATE-TIME:20260313T040000Z DTEND;VALUE=DATE-TIME:20260314T040000Z UID:281039342365 DESCRIPTION:March 13\, 2004\, two career firefighters with the City of Pit tsburg (PA) Fire Bureau were fatally injured during a structural collapse of a bell tower at the Ebenezer Baptist Church fire. Battalion Chief Charl es G. Brace (55 years of age) was acting as the Incident Safety Officer an d Master Firefighter Richard A. Stefanakis (51 years of age) was performin g overhaul\, extinguishing remaining hot spots inside the church vestibule when the bell tower collapsed on them and numerous other fire fighters. T wenty-three fire fighters injured during the collapse were transported to area hospitals. A backdraft occurred earlier in the incident that injured an additional six fire fighters. The collapse victims were extricated from the church vestibule several hours after the collapse. The victims were p ronounced dead at the scene. A total of twenty-nine other fire fighters we re injured during the incident. \n\nhttp://www.thecompanyofficer.com/2010 /03/16/learning-from-the-past-five-alarm-church-fire-and-collapse-leads-to -two-line-of-duty-deaths-lodd-and-twenty-nine-fire-fighter-injuries-three- hours-into-the-incident/#sthash.IyCibqJF.dpuf\n\nhttp://www.cdc.gov/niosh/ fire/reports/face200417.html LOCATION: END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT SUMMARY:Southwest Supermarket Fire Phoenix\, AZ (2001) DTSTART;VALUE=DATE-TIME:20260314T040000Z DTEND;VALUE=DATE-TIME:20260315T040000Z UID:640328623074 DESCRIPTION:On March 14\, 2001 the Phoenix (AZ) Fire Department lost firef ighter Brett Tarver at the Southwest Supermarket fire. In that event\, it was 5:00 in the afternoon\, the grocery store was full of people and fire was extending through the building. Phoenix E14 was assigned to the interi or of the structure to complete the search\, get any people out\, and atte mpt to confine the rapidly spreading fire to the rear of the structure. Sh ortly after completing their primary search of the building the Captain de cided it was time to get out. Tarver and the other members of Engine 14 we re exiting the building when Tarver and his partner got lost.\n\nThe engin eer (driver) was leading the group following the attack line they had brou ght into the supermarket fire\, followed by Tarver and his partner\, with the company officer being the last person to begin the long crawl out of t he smoke filled structure. At some point Tarver and his partner got off th e hose line and moved deeper in the supermarket fire away from their only exit. Early on during the exit attempt through maze like conditions Tarver and his partner basically turned left instead of right. Not knowing this the company officer continued to crawl out of the building thinking his wh ole crew was ahead of him on the attack line. Tarver and his partner crawl ed deeper into the fire occupancy eventually ending up in the butcher shop area where they eventually became separated.\n\nBased on radio reports of deteriorating conditions inside the building from E14 and other companies the Incident Commander (IC) considered a switch to a defensive strategy a nd started the process of pulling all crews out of the structure. During t his process Tarver radioed the IC telling him that he was lost in the back of the building. The IC deployed two companies as Rapid Intervention Crew s (RICs) through the front access point to no avail.\nOther companies comi ng to their rescue through the back room area of the supermarket later res cued Tarver's partner. After several unsuccessful rescue attempts\, Tarver succumbed to carbon monoxide poisoning from the acrid smoke and was event ually removed from the building as a full code. Trying to remove the 260-p ound firefighter was nearly impossible for rescue team members. Outside\, the resuscitation efforts failed.\n\nDuring the rescue efforts there were more than twelve (12) mayday's issued by firefighters trying to make the r escue. On this tragic day\, one other firefighter (attempting to rescue Ta rver) was removed in respiratory arrest and was later resuscitated by fire department paramedics on the scene.\n\nOver the next year (The Recovery)\ , the department systematically reviewed its standard operating procedures and fireground operational activities at the strategic (command)\, tactic al (sector) and task (company) levels of the entire organization in an att empt to prevent such a tragic event from ever happening again to the Phoen ix Fire Department. One of the many significant questions that was asked w as why didn't the rapid intervention concept work? Immediately after the f ire the Phoenix Fire Department reviewed its Rapid Intervention and Mayday standard operating procedures (SOPs). Based on drills\, training and the data acquired through those drills\, in the year following the incident th e standard concept of a rapid intervention is now being challenged. It is now evident that rapid intervention isn't rapid. (Reference: Excerpts from the original article by Steve Kreis and FireTimes.com\, LLC. http://www.f iretimes.com/printStory.asp?FragID=8399 )\n\nIn the wake of the 2001 South west Supermarket Fire and LODD of FF Brett Tarver\, the Phoenix (AZ) Fire Department issued a comprehensive report of the incident and the lessons l earned and research conducted by the FD.\n\nhttp://www.cdc.gov/niosh/fire/ reports/face200113.html\nhttp://www.cdc.gov/niosh/fire/reports/face200113. html LOCATION: END:VEVENT END:VCALENDAR