BEGIN:VCALENDAR VERSION:2.0 PRODID:-//chikkutakku.com//RDFCal 1.0//EN X-WR-CALDESC:GoogleカレンダーやiCalendar形式情報を共有シェ アしましょう。近所のイベントから全国のイベントま で今日のイベント検索やスケジュールを決めるならち っくたっく X-WR-CALNAME:ちっくたっく X-WR-TIMEZONE:UTC BEGIN:VEVENT SUMMARY:528 Magnolia-Toledo (2014) DTSTART;VALUE=DATE-TIME:20260126T050000Z DTEND;VALUE=DATE-TIME:20260127T050000Z UID:248117009904 DESCRIPTION:January 26\, 2014\, Toledo\, Ohio-Private Stephen A. Machcinsk i and Private James A. Dickman died during structural firefighting operati ons. Both men were assigned to Engine 3\, and suffered serious injuries wh ile responding to a structure fire at 528 Magnolia Street in North Toledo. Four engines\, one truck\, one rescue\, and a battalion chief were initia lly dispatched to a structure fire with reported people\ninside the buildi ng. Battalion Chief 1 reported smoke showing from two blocks away. Engine 3 was first on-scene followed by Battalion Chief 1.\nBattalion Chief 1 ass umed command and assigned Engine 3 who had parked in front of the building \n(Side Alpha) as Fire Attack. Engine 13 and Rescue 13 had arrived on-scen e next and were assigned as\nSearch and Back-up\, respectively. Engine 6 a rrived on scene and parked in the rear parking lot\non Side Charlie. Engin e 6 was assigned to Fire Attack on Side Charlie. Truck 17 arrived on scene \,\npulled past Engine 3\, and was ordered to open up the roof. Engine 17 was assigned as the rapid\nintervention team (RIT). The incident commander was informed by an occupant that all occupants were out of the structure but a dog was on the second floor. Engine 3 made entry through a second- f loor window and Engine 6 was at a second-floor doorway (on Side Delta). Bo th companies were advancing a 13⁄4-inch hoseline into the second-floor a partment. Battalion Chief 3 arrived on scene and reported heavy fire in th e rear. Heavy\, black smoke started coming out of the garage door and seco nd- floor window on Side Alpha. Engine 3 transmitted a Mayday. Ten seconds later\, the officer of Engine 3 came out the second-floor doorway onto th e landing and called another Mayday. Engine 7 arrived on scene and was ass igned to assist the RIT in locating the two fire fighters from Engine 3. E ngine 7 reported heavy heat conditions in the second-floor apartment while trying to search. The Engine 17 RIT found one of the fire fighters from E ngine 3 and removed him through the side door (Side Delta) and down the st airs to Life Squad1for treatment. The Engine 17 RIT had to change air cyli nders while Engine 19 and the safety officer (officer from Engine 19) cont inued the search for the other fire fighter. The Engine 17 RIT had just re -entered the structure when the second fire fighter was found. Both fire f ighters were transported to the hospital but died from their injuries.\n\n http://ftpcontent4.worldnow.com/wtol/pdf/LODDReportJanuary262014.pdf\n\nht tp://m.toledoblade.com/attachment/2015/04/29/NIOSH-investigation-of-Jan-26 -2014-fire.pdf\n\nhttp://bigstory.ap.org/article/2-toledo-firefighters-kil led-building-fire LOCATION: END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT SUMMARY:Athletic Club Fire Indianapolis DTSTART;VALUE=DATE-TIME:20260205T050000Z DTEND;VALUE=DATE-TIME:20260206T050000Z UID:413651245853 DESCRIPTION:On February 5\, 1992\, two firefighters were killed and four s eriously injured after fire erupted from a concealed space at the Indianap olis (IN) Athletic Club. A number of communications-related factors were c ited as having an impact on the outcome of the fire. The first was the fac t that Indianapolis had implemented a new 800-MHz trunked radio system two weeks before the fire. Lack of familiarity with the system by all members contributed to the communications-related problems observed during the fi re.12\nSecond\, a fire captain was seriously burned when he removed his gl ove to activate the emergency distress alarm on his portable radio. The bu tton for the emergency distress alarm was virtually impossible to activate with a gloved hand. The captain also attempted to verbally request assist ance using his portable radio but was unsuccessful.\nThird\, the incident commander's request for a second alarm was delayed while another alarm was dispatched. Then\, after the second-alarm request was received\, there wa s a seven-minute delay in processing it. This delay was attributed to a la ck of familiarity with the new computer-aided dispatch system and new proc edures.\n\nhttp://www.usfa.fema.gov/downloads/pdf/publications/tr-063.pdf LOCATION: END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT SUMMARY:Bricelyn Street Fire Pittsburgh\, PA (1995) DTSTART;VALUE=DATE-TIME:20260214T050000Z DTEND;VALUE=DATE-TIME:20260215T050000Z UID:584811417891 DESCRIPTION:Three Pittsburgh firefighters died on February 14\, 1995\, whe n they ran out of air and were unable to escape from the interior of a bur ning dwelling. The three victims were all assigned to Engine Company 17 an d had advanced the first hoseline into the house to attack an arson fire i n the base- ment. When found\, all three were together in one room and had exhausted their air supplies. Three other firefighters had been rescued f rom the same room\, which caused confusion over the status of the initial attack team.\n\nhttp://www.usfa.fema.gov/downloads/pdf/publications/tr-078 .pdf\n\nhttps://www.iaff.org/hs/LODD_Manual/LODD%20Reports/Pittsburgh\,%20 PA%20-%20Brooks\,%20Conroy\,%20Kolenda.pdf\n LOCATION: END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT SUMMARY:Katie Jane Nursing Home Fire DTSTART;VALUE=DATE-TIME:20260217T050000Z DTEND;VALUE=DATE-TIME:20260218T050000Z UID:603319280453 DESCRIPTION:The Warrenton Nursing Home fire took place at the Katie Jane M emorial Home for the Aged in Warrenton\, Missouri on February 17\, 1957 an d killed 72 people. The 2 1⁄2-story facility\, located sixty miles west of St. Louis\, housed 155 elderly people and had been converted just two y ears earlier after having previously served as the site of Central Wesleya n College.\nThe blaze began at approximately 2:40 p.m. in a first floor an nex linen closet during a Sunday afternoon religious service. On the first floor of the main building\, Lutheran minister Walter Schwane was leading a hymn\, "What a Friend We Have in Jesus\," when a scream was heard from one of the visitors who had noticed smoke near the room of her uncles. Con cerned\, she soon saw intense flames near the closet and screamed "Fire!" as she raced throughout the facility.\nWithin 30 minutes\, the annex build ing became an inferno with local residents offering help in attempting to rescue residents. Eventually\, the building's roof caved in\, with flames shooting high into the air and smoke visible from 30 miles away.\nIn the a ftermath of the tragedy\, it was determined that a number of factors serve d as potential causes\, including wood in the building that was more than 50 years old\, coupled with thermostats often kept at 85-90 degrees to kee p residents comfortable during the frigid winter months.\nDuring the subse quent investigation the Home had been operating without a license\, had in adequate fire escapes and had no sprinkler system. In addition\, there was no alarm system or evacuation plan\, while some residents were locked in their rooms\, a common practice of that period.\nThe end result of those o missions came when Missouri governor James T. Blair signed a bill in March 1957 that established minimum safety standards for nursing homes in the s tate\n\nhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Warrenton_Nursing_Home_Fire LOCATION: END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT SUMMARY:The Station Nightclub Fire DTSTART;VALUE=DATE-TIME:20260220T050000Z DTEND;VALUE=DATE-TIME:20260221T050000Z UID:933792287247 DESCRIPTION:The Station Nightclub Fire occurred in West Warwick\, Rhode Is land\, in 2003. The fire began when the tour manager of Great White\, the headlining band\, set off pyrotechnics that spread through the soundproofi ng foam at the back of the stage. The flames quickly moved to the ceiling\ , creating billows of smoke and a panicked race for the front door. There was no automatic fire sprinkler system to put out the flames\, and of the 404 nightclub occupants\, 100 were killed and 200 were injured.\nThe club did not have an automatic fire sprinkler system to extinguish the fire\, a nd most of the victims died at the primary entrance where the rush of fran tic spectators created a logjam at the front door. Although the club was a t capacity\, it was not overcrowded\, so failed escape attempts were not a result of the overcrowding of the nightclub. Instead\, they resulted from the fact that people neglected to use exit routes other than the front do or. For this reason\, Campus Safety and Security and FPS have teamed with the Student Government\, Texas State Fire Marshal’s office\, and Lower C olorado River Authority in the Have an Exit Strategy campaign\, to heighte n awareness among nightclub and party goers that\, “The best way out may not the be way in.”\n\nhttp://www.nfpa.org/safety-information/for-consu mers/occupancies/nightclubs-assembly-occupancies/the-station-nightclub-fir e\n LOCATION: END:VEVENT END:VCALENDAR