BEGIN:VCALENDAR VERSION:2.0 PRODID:-//chikkutakku.com//RDFCal 1.0//EN X-WR-CALDESC:GoogleカレンダーやiCalendar形式情報を共有シェ アしましょう。近所のイベントから全国のイベントま で今日のイベント検索やスケジュールを決めるならち っくたっく X-WR-CALNAME:ちっくたっく X-WR-TIMEZONE:UTC BEGIN:VEVENT SUMMARY:Yarnell Fire\, AZ (2013) DTSTART;VALUE=DATE-TIME:20250630T040000Z DTEND;VALUE=DATE-TIME:20250701T040000Z UID:106279130762 DESCRIPTION:Yarnell Fire\, AZ (2013) Nineteen firefighters died on the Ya rnell Hill Fire in central Arizona on June 30\, 2013 after deploying fire shelters. They were members of the Granite Mountain Interagency Hotshot Cr ew (IHC)\, hosted by the Prescott Fire Department. One crewmember was sepa rated from the crew earlier that day and was not at the deployment site.\n \nhttp://www.iawfonline.org/Yarnell_Hill_Fire_report.pdf LOCATION: END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT SUMMARY:Hackensack Ford\, Hackensack\, NJ (1998) DTSTART;VALUE=DATE-TIME:20250701T040000Z DTEND;VALUE=DATE-TIME:20250702T040000Z UID:161501593282 DESCRIPTION:Five firefighters were killed on July 1\, 1988 inside an autom otive dealership in Hackensack\, New Jersey. At 3:00 pm initial companies arrived on the scene after reports of “flames and smoke” coming from t he Hackensack Ford Dealership to find a heavy smoke condition at the roof. Companies were assigned inside and to the roof to investigate the source of the smoke. The interior company\, manned with 6 firefighters and equipp ed with a 1 ½” hand line\, found light smoke conditions while the venti lation company noted heavy smoke conditions with no signs of structural we akness. The tactical decision was made to ventilate the roof and attempt to reach the fire through a scuttle access in the ceiling. This was pursue d until 3:34 pm when the battalion chief ordered all lines to be backed ou t. A minute later the truck company reported high heat and heavy fire at t he roof\, even though interior crews reported little heat or smoke. Soon a fter this transmission there was a roof collapse where the interior crews were working. One firefighter managed to escape. His gear was badly burned .\n Three minutes after the collapse a mayday was transmitted by a lieuten ant that stated the he and another firefighter were “stuck inside the re ar of the building”. This initial transmission was never acknowledged on scene. Members at headquarters heard the transmission and relayed the inf ormation to command. For the next eleven minutes\, radio transmissions con tinued from one of the firefighters trying to relay his position. Rescue e fforts continued but were not successful. The bodies of the five firefight ers were only removed after the fire was extinguished an hour later. Three bodies were found about 20 feet from the scuttle hole. The other two were found in a tool room in the rear of the service area. The cause of the f ire was ruled accidental and originated in the attic space above the servi ce area. In this area there were an abundant amount of automotive parts\, tires\, and other combustible materials. Not only was this a huge fire loa d\, but the weight weakened the structural integrity of the roof. There we re no fire protection systems in place.\nhttps://youtu.be/Sfb-D6-ALh8\n\nh ttp://www.nytimes.com/1988/07/02/nyregion/5-firefighters-killed-in-jersey- as-a-roof-collapses.html\n\nhttp://www.nfpa.org/assets/files/PDF/Research/ DealershipHackensack.pdf\n\n LOCATION: END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT SUMMARY:Kingman BLEVE\, Kingman\, AZ (1973) DTSTART;VALUE=DATE-TIME:20250705T040000Z DTEND;VALUE=DATE-TIME:20250706T040000Z UID:223911470269 DESCRIPTION:On July 5\, 1973\, Kingman was the site of a catastrophic BLEV E (Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapor Explosion) which killed 11 firefighters. The explosion occurred following a fire that broke out as propane was bei ng transferred from a railroad car to a storage tank. This explosion has b ecome a classic incident studied in fire department training programs worl dwide. Tank car #38214 was setting on a spur in the hot sun that the Willi ams Energy Company leased from the Santa Fe Railroad. The car carried 33\, 000 gallons of propane gas which was to be transferred to storage tanks 75 yards away. This was at the Doxol Gas Western Energy Co. bulk plant (2512 East Highway 66)\, in the Hilltop business district on Kingman's southeas t side. Eemployees of the Williams Energy Company\, began opening the tank car's valves to transfer its load into smaller storage tanks in the compa ny yard. A leak was detected in one of the fittings and an attempt was mad e to correct it by striking the fitting with a large wrench. The gas ignit ed and turned the tank car into a huge blowtorch enveloping the two men. F lames shot 70 to 80 feet in the air in a V-shape.\nThe two men jumped or f ell off the car. One of them stumbled across the street \,a quarter mile t o the Highway Patrol office and stated his co-worker was still at the burn ing car. A ten-man squad of the 75-man Kingman Volunteer Fire Department r esponded to the alarm and began spraying the car with water\, hoping to ke ep the tank car cool and to prevent a pressure buildup inside it. Water wo n't extinguish burning propane\, but the Kingman FD had no equipment which would\, so all it could do was try to prevent an explosion. It sounded li ke the thunderous roar of a jet airliner taking off\, the tank car quieted for a second\, sucked the huge column of flames down into it\, swelled up and popped like a giant champagne cork. Two more times the flames vanishe d into the car and popped out. By this time one of the large transfer hose s was sending burning propane against the side of the tank car.\nA large c rowed of spectators congregated along Route 66 which separated them from t he burning tank car by nothing but less than two hundred yards of open des ert. Kingman police and Arizona Highway patrolmen were establishing roadbl ocks 1\,000 feet from the fire. Two minutes before two o'clock\, just as a n order to move people farther back was given\, the tank car exploded. The Kingman explosion sent debris and flames up to 2\,000 feet away with the three-ton end of the half-inch-thick metal tanker landing a quarter mile d own the tracks. There was a crater 10 feet deep left where the tank car ha d been sitting. Flaming propane sprayed by the explosion along with fallin g debris from this cloud\, ignited several buildings in the vicinity. The victims jammed the Mohave County General Hospital. Planes and helicopters flew the most seriously burned victims to hospitals at Phoenix\, 175 miles to the southeast\, and Las Vegas\, Nev.\, 100 miles to the northwest.\nSl urry bombers\, stationed here by the Bureau of Land Management to fight ra nge fires\, dumped fire retardent mixtures on the flames which spread acro ss the highway. Helicopters were sent by the highway patrol and two Air Fo rce bases. The scene of the fire was highly visible to most of the town's residents. A radio station's news flash and the fire department's siren pr obably drew more spectators to the scene than would have otherwise come ou t of mer curiosity. Mohave County Sheriff's Office\, Department of Public Safety\, and Arizona Game and Fish personnel were joined by private citize ns in sealing off the fire area and rerouting the massive traffic. Mohave General Hospital received 107 casualties from the explosion by way of the one ambulance\, private cars\, police cars\, and anything else available. Security at the hospital was to have been provided by outside personnel as well -- but many of these were themselves\, being treated for injuries or worse.\nSpectators and visitors gathered both outside the emergency depar tment and inside the treatment area. Due to the severe injuries there was an executive decision made to let the loved ones be allowed inside with th e patients. The hospital was an unbelievable sight. The corridors were ful l of burn victims\, families\, doctors\, and nurses. Total material damage exceeded one million dollars. Everything for three to four hundred feet f rom the tank car's location was black and charred. After the explosion\, t he fire code became an instant issue. Essentially\, all the new ordinance did was require all bulk storage tanks to be diked and to have some kind o f foam fire extinguisher system.\nThe ones in town that were moved\, were provided an area out by the airport. Spur tracks like the one the explosio n happened on\, were to be sunk so that those cars would be in a pit. If t hey exploded\, the pit would force the blast upward so it wouldn't cause a s much damage. As a result of the Kingman disaster\, standard procedures for handling a BLEVE now became well-known in fire departments throughout the country. Films and pictures taken at the disaster are part of the trai ning course. As a result of the Kingman disaster\, standard procedures fo r handling a BLEVE now became well-known in fire departments throughout th e country. Films and pictures taken at the disaster are part of the traini ng course. Ironically\, a seminar had been scheduled for Kingman on July 1 1 (6 days after the fire)\, to discuss "dangerous cargo spillage."\n\nhttp ://www.firefighternation.com/article/news-2/kingman-bleve-40-years-later LOCATION: END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT SUMMARY:Hartford Circus Fire\, Hartford\, CT (1944) DTSTART;VALUE=DATE-TIME:20250706T040000Z DTEND;VALUE=DATE-TIME:20250707T040000Z UID:792338775859 DESCRIPTION:Hartford Circus Fire\, Hartford\, CT (1944) The fire began as a small flame about 15 minutes into the show\, on the southwest sidewall of the tent\, while the Great Wallendas were on. Circus Bandleader Merle E vans is said to be the person who first spotted the flames\, and immediate ly directed the band to play "Stars and Stripes Forever"\, the tune that t raditionally signaled distress to all circus personnel. Ringmaster Fred Br adna urged the audience not to panic and to leave in an orderly fashion\, but the power failed and he could not be heard. Bradna and the ushers unsu ccessfully tried to maintain some order as the panicked crowd tried to fle e the big top.\nSources and investigators differ on how many people were k illed and injured. Various people and organizations say it was 167\, 168\, or 169 persons (the 185 figure is usually based on official tallies that included a collection of body parts that were listed as a "victim") with o fficial treated injury estimates running over 700 people. The number of ac tual injuries is believed to be higher than those figures\, since many peo ple were seen that day heading home in shock without seeking treatment in the city. The only animals in the big top at the time were the big cats tr ained by May Kovar and Joseph Walsh that had just finished performing when the fire started. The big cats were herded through the chutes leading fro m the performing cages to several cage wagons\, and were unharmed except f or a few minor burns.\nThe cause of the fire remains unproven. Investigato rs at the time believed it was caused by a carelessly flicked cigarette bu t others suspected an arsonist. Several years later while being investigat ed on other arson charges\, Robert Dale Segee (1929–1997) who was an ado lescent roustabout at the time\, confessed to starting the blaze. He was n ever tried for the crime and later recanted his confession.\nBecause the b ig top tent had been coated with 1\,800 lb (816 kg) of paraffin wax dissol ved in 6\,000 US gallons (23 m³) of gasoline (some sources say kerosene)\ , a common waterproofing method of the time\, the flames spread rapidly. M any people were badly burned by the melting paraffin\, which rained down l ike napalm from the roof. The fiery tent collapsed in about eight minutes according to eyewitness survivors\, trapping hundreds of spectators beneat h it.\nThe circus had been experiencing shortages of personnel and equipme nt due to World War II. Delays and malfunctions in the ordinarily smooth o rder of the circus had become commonplace. Two years earlier\, on August 4 \, 1942\, a fire had broken out in the menagerie\, killing a number of ani mals. Circus personnel were concerned about the 1944 Hartford show for oth er reasons. Two shows had been scheduled for July 5\, but the first had to be canceled because the circus trains arrived late and the circus could n ot set up in time. In circus superstition\, missing a show is considered e xtremely bad luck\, and although the July 5 evening show ran as planned\, many circus employees may have been on their guard\, half-expecting an eme rgency or catastrophe.\nIt is commonly believed that the number of fatalit ies is higher than the estimates given\, due to poorly kept residency reco rds in rural towns\, and the fact that some smaller remains were never ide ntified or claimed. It is also believed that the intense heat from the fir e combined with the accelerants\, the paraffin and gasoline\, could have i ncinerated people completely\, as in cremation\, leaving no substantial ph ysical evidence behind. Additionally\, free tickets had been handed out th at day to many people in and around the city\, some of whom appeared to ey ewitnesses and circus employees to be drifters\, who would never have been reported missing by anyone if they were killed in the disaster. The numbe r of people in the audience that day has never been established with certa inty\, but the closest estimate is about 7\,000.[1]\nWhile many people wer e burned to death by the fire\, many others died as a result of the ensuin g chaos. Though most spectators were able to escape the fire\, many people were caught up in the hysteria and panicked. Witnesses said some people s imply ran around in circles trying to find their loved ones\, rather than trying to escape the burning tent. Some escaped but ran back inside to fin d family members. Others stayed in their seats until it was too late\, ass uming that the fire would be put out promptly\, and the show would continu e.\nBecause at least two of the exits were blocked\, by the chutes used to bring the show's big cats in and out of the tent\, people trying to escap e could not bypass them. Some died from injuries sustained after leaping f rom the tops of the bleachers in hopes they could escape under the sides o f the tent\, though that method of escape ended up killing more people tha n it saved. Others died after being trampled by other spectators\, with so me asphyxiating underneath the piles of people who had fallen down over ea ch other.\nMost of the dead were found in piles\, some three bodies deep\, at the most congested exits. A small number of people were found alive at the bottoms of these piles\, protected by the bodies that were on top of them when the burning big top ultimately fell down on those still trapped beneath it. Because of a picture that appeared in several newspapers of sa d tramp clown Emmett Kelly holding a water bucket\, the event became known as "the day the clowns cried."\n\nhttp://www.circusfire1944.com/\n\n LOCATION: END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT SUMMARY:Nate Flynn LODD (2018) DTSTART;VALUE=DATE-TIME:20250723T040000Z DTEND;VALUE=DATE-TIME:20250724T040000Z UID:733878707756 DESCRIPTION:On July 23\, 2018\, a lightning strike at approximately 01:20 hours ignited a fire within the residence located at 7005 Woodscape Drive\ , Clarksville\, Maryland. Smelling smoke\, the residents called 911 to rep ort the lightning strike and visible smoke in their home at 01:52:14. The Howard County Communication Center\, which serves as the Public Safety Ans wering Point for Howard County\, then dispatched a Local Box Alarm 5-62 to the residence. The Local Box Assignment from Howard County Department of Fire and Rescue Services (HCDFRS) included Paramedic 56\, Engine 101\, Eng ine 51\, Tower 10\, and Battalion 1.The residential structure at 7005 Wood scape Drive was a uniquely shaped single-family dwelling spanning approxim ately 8\,400 square feet. There are no fire hydrants on Woodscape Drive\, however the residence included a swimming pool at the rear of the property . One aspect of 7005 Woodscape Drive that contributed to this incident’ s complexity was the grade change along the rear of the residence (referr ed to as Side C throughout this report).HCDFRS established command at 02:0 0:29 and upgraded the dispatch assignment to a full metro-box alarm. While en route\, Battalion 1 (Incident Commander) instructed Engine 51 to use t he pool at the rear of the property to establish a water supply\, unaware that the first two arriving engines had not initiated a water supply plan. At 02:07:51\, Engine 51 entered the structure on the upper level of Side C (laundry room door) but did not advise command of either their level of entry or the conditions they encountered. Repositioning to the lower level of Side C\, Engine 51 re-entered the structure but did not make the Incid ent Commander aware of the grade change along Side C. At 02:12:41\, the I ncident Commander advised all units that residents had evacuated the struc ture.At 02:15:48\, Engine 101A advised the Incident Commander of visible f ire on the upper level of Side C and that they needed to redeploy back up to their initial entrance (upper level of Side C) to reach the fire. Advan cing a pre-connected hose line from Engine 51\, Engine 101 entered the str ucture through the laundry room door located at the upper level of Side C. At approximately 02:20:11\, FF Flynn had fallen through the first floor i nto a basement level crawlspace containing active fire and high heat condi tions.Engine 101A\, recognizing that FF Flynn had fallen through the floor \, declared a MAYDAY emergency on Bravo 1\, the radio talk group used for operations during this incident. While clarifying the MAYDAY emergency wit h Incident Command on Bravo 1\, FF Flynn transmitted his own MAYDAY state ment including a clear “Who\, What\, Where” on Bravo 2—an unmonitore d radio Talk Group. The Incident Commander quickly deployed the Rapid Inte rvention Crew (RIC)\, which entered the basement at approximately 02:27:17 in search of FF Flynn. Overcoming numerous obstacles\, including multiple crew members becoming entangled in wiring\, the RIC located and extricate d FF Flynn by 02:43:39—fifteen minutes and five seconds after their init ial entry.After FF Flynn was removed from the dwelling\, those on scene fo llowed and exceeded all BLS\, ALS\, and ACLS protocols as FF Flynn was tra nsported to Howard County General Hospital. Tragically\, FF Flynn did not survive.https://www.howardcountymd.gov/sites/default/files/2021-08/Flynn%2 0LODD%20Report_FINAL%20(Declassified).pdf LOCATION: END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT SUMMARY:Little Sisters of the Poor Fire\, Pittsburgh\, PA (1931) DTSTART;VALUE=DATE-TIME:20250724T040000Z DTEND;VALUE=DATE-TIME:20250725T040000Z UID:262373165057 DESCRIPTION:Little Sisters of the Poor Fire\, Pittsburgh\, PA (1931) -- Th irty persons were known to be dead\, twenty were missing and more than 100 were in hospitals after a fire had destroyed the home for the aged of the Little Sisters of the Poor here tonight.
Most of the dead were aged and infirm inmates of the home which was located at the corner of South Aiken and Penn avenues\, in the East End district.
The fire which apparently started in the lower part of the building near the institution's morgue\, was first sighted by a nearby resident who turned in the alarm. Six alarms were sounded in rapid succession as the seriousness of the situation was discerned\, and firemen and police were called from all parts of the city. 
250 Inmates In Home At Time.
In the home at the time the fire started were 250 inmates\, about evenly divided between men and women.
The flam es quickly spread through the home and many aged persons could be steen st anding at windows screaming for help. Nuns and Brothers of a religious ord er aided the firemen in the work of rescue. After a four hour fight the fi re was brought under control and rescue parties entered the smouldering ru ins in a search for further bodies.
The Mother Superior of the Instituti on was among those most active in assisting the elderly men and women from the building. After the fire had spread so that it was dangerous for anyo ne to enter\, she had to be forcibly detained from further attempts at res cue.
Six of the missing were volunteer rescue workers who entered the bu ilding in search of bodies.
30\,000 Persons View Flames.
Police battle d an estimated crowd of 30\,000 persons who gathered as the flames lighted up the skies.
Most of the inmates of the home were all but helpless bef ore the fire. All were old and most of them suffering from infirmities.
 Seven women were trapped in a third floor room among them a MRS. MARY KLIN E\, 80\, who is blind.
"I just got down on my knees and prayed to God\," she said\, "and then I was rescued."
Despite the care given those rescu ed from the home\, DR. W. HOARD EVANS said he believed that the shock of t he tragedy would be fatal to many because of their extreme age. All those in the home were more than 60 years old.
Dead Not Identified Hours After Fire.
Hours after the fire the dead could not be identified except in a few cases.
In the Penn avenue and South Aiken avenue courts of the burn ing building\, scores of volunteers massed on a stout fire escape and pass ed inmates from hand to hand until they were brought to the ground.
With out the assistance of the many volunteers most of them young men from the nearby balloon field district of the city\, firemen would have been unable to cope with the situation. Scores of neighbors who hurried to the home a s the first cry of "fire" was heard said they were unable to enter the gro unds because heavy iron gates to the sidewalk and drive way were closed. 
Many of the volunteer rescuers scaled the high stone walls about the in stitution and firemen arriving a few minutes later battered down the gates to get equipment inside.
In some instances ladders placed against the w alls of the building were burned away before firemen could mount them. The n the life nets were brought out and many of the aged occupants whom firem en could not reach jumped to safety.
All Records Of Home Saved.
Fire d epartment officials said that all records containing the names of the home 's residents had been saved and with the air of these records they started a final check on the dead and missing.
The cause of the fire has not be en determined. From the first floor where it apparently started\, it sprea d rapidly to other sections of the home.
Oxygen was administered on the lawn to many of the victims and beside them reposed hly images salvaged by the faithful on occasion at the risk of their lives. MRS. MARGARET CONNEL L\, 75\, one of the many who tried to aid feeble and ill fellow-inmates to safety told how women battled againse suffocation and heat.
Aged Woman Describes Holocaust.
"We were almost suffocating\," MRS. CONNELL said. " The women had to run from window to window for air. Sister PASCALINO in ch arge of the floor made them stick their heards out and breathe before goin g on. There were no lights and the heat on the floor was intense. I felt t oo wrak to go on. I sand back on a bed and a fireman carried me out."
Si ster PASCALINO remained at her post directing rescue efforts and refused t o leave until the floor was cleared.
One body was taken from the ruins a ppeared to be that of a nun. It was clad in block clothes not unlike that of a habit. A number of other sisters collapsed while bringing inmates fro m the doomed structure.
A score or more of priests from various parts of the city risted their lives in the flaming home to administer last rites to the dying.\n LOCATION: END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT SUMMARY:LODD John Nance Columbus\, OH (1987) DTSTART;VALUE=DATE-TIME:20250725T040000Z DTEND;VALUE=DATE-TIME:20250726T040000Z UID:110083562802 DESCRIPTION:LODD John Nance Columbus\, OH (1987) On Saturday July 25\, 19 87 (3-Unit)\,F.F. John Nance was the Acting Officer on Fire Engine No. 3. An alarm was reported at the Mithoff Building located at 151 N. High St. in downtown Columbus\, Ohio. At 10:40 Assistant Chief Mills upgraded the a ssignment to a working 2nd alarm. This added more Firefighting Companies. The Companies were fighting the fire with heavy smoke conditions. Firefigh ter Nance fell into the burning basement thought a hole burnt into the sto re floor. Ladders and ropes were lowered into the floor opening and many o ther rescue atttempts were made to save Firefighter John W. Nance. This wa s determined an arson fire and John's death was ruled to be a murder. \n\n https://www.google.com/amp/s/www.columbusmonthly.com/article/20140206/NEWS /302068552%3ftemplate=ampart\n LOCATION: END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT SUMMARY:Shamrock Oil and Gas Corp. Fire\, Sun Ray\, TX (1956) DTSTART;VALUE=DATE-TIME:20250729T040000Z DTEND;VALUE=DATE-TIME:20250730T040000Z UID:169541397616 DESCRIPTION:On July 29\, 1956\, 19 firefighters were killed while battling a fire at the Shamrock Oil Refinery in northern Texas. This incident caus ed the fourth largest loss of firefighter lives in U.S. history.\nWe remem ber those killed 54 year ago tomorrow: Allen W. Cleveland\, Billy Joe Dunn \, Sam A. Gibson\, Jr.\, Albert O. Milligan\, Paschal Pool\, Meryl W. Slag le\, Donald W. Thompson\, Ray Biles\, Lewis A. Broxson\, Gilford R. Corse\ , Claude Emmett\, Alvin Freeman\, D.C. Lilley\, James L. Rivers\, Virgil W . Thomas\, Gayle Weird\, Rupert Weir\, Charles Lummus and Joe West. All we re firefighters who worked for either the Sunray or Dumas volunteer fire d epartments or the Shamrock Industrial Fire Brigade.\nFlammable hexane and pentane vapors began escaping from the spheroid designated as No. 199 at t he Shamrock Oil and Gas Refinery. A relief valve released\, turning pentan e loose to the ground. The wind was blowing toward the process area\, spec ifically an asphalt tank about 350 feet away under which a small fire was kept. This photo shows tank 199 before the BLEVE.\nAt 6:53 a.m.\, the 12\, 000-barrel\, pumpkin-shaped spheroid tank containing about 500\,000 gallon s of pentane and hexane gases exploded\, sending a mushrooming fireball in to the air and burning fuel to rain down for more than a mile.\nOn the mor ning of July 29\, 1956\, flammable hexane and pentane vapors began escapin g from the spheroid designated as No. 199 at the Shamrock Oil and Gas Refi nery\, a petroleum tank farm located between the small towns of Sunray and Dumas\, Texas. According to an article in Industrial Fire World\, a relie f valve released\, turning pentane loose to the ground. The wind was blowi ng toward the process area\, specifically an asphalt tank about 350 feet a way under which a small fire was kept. At about 5:45 a.m.\, vapors ignited \, then flashed back to No. 199.\nAccording to the NFPA\, for the next hou r\, firefighters and plant workers were occupied with both a ground fire i nvolving a liquid spill from a possible line leak in the vicinity of the t ank’s pump inside the dike\, and a fire at the gauging device and vents. Eventually\, flames from the dike fire rose 40 feet high\, enveloping the spheroid.\nAt 6:53 a.m.\, the 12\,000-barrel\, pumpkin-shaped spheroid ta nk containing about 500\,000 gallons of pentane and hexane gases exploded\ , sending a mushrooming fireball into the air and burning fuel to rain dow n for more than a mile. The fireball ignited a 20\,000-barrel diesel oil t ank that contained 6\,500 gallons\, as well as two tanks of crude oil\; on e contained 6\,000 to 8\,000 barrels and the other contained 2\,000 barrel s. These tanks were 450 to 550 feet from spheroid No. 199. An 80\,000-barr el with a floating roof containing gasoline located about 225 feet away ha d two seal fires that were extinguished. A sixth tank smoldered but was al so extinguished. \nAccording to GenDisasters\, 15 firefighters burned to d eath almost instantly when the hot wall of fire shot across the ground. Th e other four died later of complications from their burns. Forty others\, exposed to the explosion from a great distance\, were severely burned.\nTh e fire burned for days.\n LOCATION: END:VEVENT END:VCALENDAR